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PROOF OF MENTAL INCOMPETENCY AND THE
UNEXPRESSED MAJOR PREMISE*
MILTON D. GREENt
THERE is probably no individual alive who conforms to the require-
ments of complete normality. The author of a well-known text book on
psychiatry has said: "The difference between the behavior of so-called
'normal' and 'abnormal' people is quantitative rather than qualitative.
'Crazy' people are simply extremists. It is not so much a question whether
a given individual is sane or insane, but rather, how sane or insane is
he?" 1 Another text on psychiatry states: "A psychiatrist of long and
fruitful experience once remarked that the chief difference between the
normal man and the one who was mentally sick, was that the latter was
inside the walls of a hospital and the former was not."-
From the standpoint of a physician mental disorder does not become
significant in any individual case until its symptoms manifest themselves
in such a way as to interfere with that individual in his daily life, or with
the daily lives of his associates. The interest of the physician in mental
disorder is twofold. His primary function is therapeutic: to diagnose
the condition, to determine the cause, and to administer the appropriate
treatment either to bring about a restoration of health, if possible, or,
at least, to minimize the effects of the disease and prevent its further
development. His therapeutic function in treating mental illness is, in
short, the same as his function in treating bodily illness. He is trying
to alleviate suffering and to restore health. His secondary function is
to protect society from the disturbances which are caused by the highly
anti-social types of mental disorder. This function is fulfilled by seeing
that individuals so afflicted are removed from society and placed in insti-
tutions where their psychopathic behavior will not interfere with the
lives of others. It is a function similar to that of quarantining persons
* This article is one of a series of five submitted in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments of the Faculty of Law, Columbia University, for the degree of Doctor of the Science
of Law. The other articles are: The Operative Effect of ifental Incompetency on
Agreemnents and Wills (1943) 21 Tan. L. REv. 554; Fraud, Undue Inflisencc and Menial
Incompetency_--a Study in Related Concepts (1943) 43 CoL L. REV. 176; Judicial TcsIs
of Mental Incompetency (1941) 6 MIo. L. REv. 141; Public Policies Underlying the Laz
of Men3tal Incompetency (1940) 38 MicH. L. REv. 1189.
The author should not like to complete this series of articles without ackmowledging
the deep indebtedness which he owes to Professor Edwin NV. Patterson, of Columbia Uni-
versity, who has given frecly of his time and criticism.
I Acting Dean and Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. SADum, TaoRn AmD PRAcTIcE oF PSyCHTRY (1936) 781.
2. STNRECER AND EBAUGH, PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSyCHIATRY (4th ed. 1935) 20.
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suffering from contagious diseases or confining them in hospitals until
they are no longer a threat to society.
Psychiatry, although constantly adding to its store of knowledge, is
a relatively new specialty in the field of medicine, and it is still groping
for answers to many of the fundamental questions regarding mental dis-
order.8 There are various schools of psychiatry ;4 techniques of diagnosis
and treatment differ, and, as yet, there is not even substantial agreement
on the classification of mental disorders.' The aetiology of a few types
of mental disorder has been determined, but many are still classified
merely according to the symptoms displayed. Inasmuch as many symp-
toms are common to many types of mental disorder, general agreement
upon diagnosis in any particular case is extremely unlikely. "IKempf,
speaking of the diagnosis and classification of nervous diseases, ven-
tured the opinion that if twenty cases were given to twenty psychiatrists
separately for diagnosis and their findings were sealed and submitted
to a committee for comparison, the whole scheme of diagnosis would
blow up." 0
Nevertheless, there are certain rather well defined types of mental dis-
order. A few of these have particular significance in cases dealing with
the effect of mental unsoundness upon contractual and testamentary
capacity. One type is mere mental deficiency, manifested by intellectual
deficiency in development. It includes idiots, imbeciles, and morons, who
are generically referred to as mental defectives. Mental deficiency is large-
ly a congenital condition. Its chief symptom is a very low degree of intelli-
gence and understanding, very often measured in terms of the intelli-
gence of children. An idiot has the intelligence of a two or three year
old child, an imbecile that of a child between three and seven, and a moron
that of a child from seven to twelve.' Another type is senile dementia,
which may be described as the mental deterioration of old age. Among
its symptoms are: loss of memdry, confusion, deterioration of perception,
hallucinations, melancholia, and delusions, frequently of the paranoid type.
The symptoms tend to increase in number and become progressive in
degree. Delusions of persecution and of marital infidelity are not un-
common in the later stages.8 Another type is general paresis, caused
by damage to or destruction of brain tissue as the result of syphilitic in-
3. NoYES, MODERN CLINIcAl. PSYCiATRY (2d ed. 1934) 92.
4. Sadler lists and discusses eight main "schools." SADLER, op. d. supra note 1, at
10-43.
5. HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, A TEXT-BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (4th ed. 1937) c. 2;
STRECKER AND EBAUGH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 46 et seq.
6. SADLER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 212.
7. HENDERSON AxD GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 14.
8. BLUEmEL, THE TROUBLED MIND (1938) c. LVI; LANDIS AND PAGE, MODERN
SocIEr AND MENTAL DISEASE (1938) 11; STRECKEli AND EBAUGH, op. cit. supra note 2,
154 et seq.
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fection. Among its symptoms are: confusion, delusions (often of grand-
eur), diminution of intelligence, lack of judgment, loss of the finer sensi-
bilities, and moral delinquency.' These are the three types which appear
most commonly in the legal controversies dealt with in this article.
Another group of mental disorders is marked by paranoid symptoms:
systematized delusions of reference and of persecution; pathological sus-
picion; defective judgment; and sometimes hallucinations. Since the para-
noid interprets life in terms of his fears, his logic is awry, and he has
no sense of proportion.'0 Dementia praecox (schizophrenia) is another
type, the symptoms of which are: marked change in personality, con-
fusion, delusions, and hallucinations. n  Still another type is nelancholia.
Among its symptoms are: confusion, diminution in intelligence, inde-
cision, delusions, and occasionally hallucinations. It is often, morever,
a recurrent illness.'2 Infection psychoses often follow in the wake of acute
infections such as typhoid, pneumonia, and influenza, and sometimes
develop after trauma. Symptoms of these psychoses include delirium,
stuporous states, confusion, and hallucinations.' 3 Alcohol and drugs may
also produce psychoses which are indicated by such symptoms as delirium,
confusion, hallucinations, delusions, and change in personality.- 4
Mental disorder becomes legally significant when it becomes sufficiently
pronounced to destroy contractual capacity, testamentary capacity, or
criminal responsibility. It may also serve as the basis for committing a
person to an institution or appointing a guardian for him, or render him
incompetent as a witness, or disqualify him from holding public office.
The present article is concerned with mental disorder only as it affects
contractual and testamentary capacity.'
Courts have devised certain standards for determining whether or not
mental disorder in any particular case is sufficient to destroy capacity
to enter into a binding agreement or to make a valid will. The standard
9. BL um.L, op. cit. supra note S, c. LVII; LANDIS AND PAGE, op. Cit. stpra note 8,
at 12; STEcKER AND EBAUGH, op. cit. surpra note 2, 103 et scq.
10. BLUEmEL, op. cit. supra note 8, c. LIX; HENDErSON AND GILLESPiE, Op. cit. supra
note 5, c. 10; LANDIS AND PAGE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 13.
11. BLUEmEL, op. cit. supra note 8, c. LX; LANDIS AND PAGE, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 13.
12. BLuS ZEL, op. cit. Tupra note 8, c. LVIIL Under more modern classifications
melancholia has been subdivided into manic-depressive psychoses and involutional melan-
cholia. HENDERSON AND GiLLEsPiE, op. cit. supra note 5, cc. 7, 8; LANDIS AND PAGE, op.
cit. supra note 8, at 13-14.
13. HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 297 et seq.
14. Id. at 52, 28L
15. "Contractual capacity" as used throughout this article embraces consensual tran-
sactions in general, including, in addition to bargaining transactions, gifts and voluntary
conveyances. Contracts to marry are not included because the consensual aspects of the
marriage contract are complicated by eugenic considerations, which involve an entirely
distinct problem.
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as applied to wills is not the same as the standard applied to contracts,
nor is there a uniform standard for either. Standards vary from state
to state; and even within the same state, there is a tendency for the stand-
ard to undergo a progressive series of mutations. They have, however,
one common element: the mental disorder, in order to destroy capacity,
must impair the capacity of the individual to understand the transaction
in question. Beyond this, courts are in hopeless conflict as to the degree
of understanding which an individual must possess in order to be com-
petent. In an earlier article 16 the author has attempted to demonstrate
that the judicial tests of mental incompetency are hopelessly inadequate
as tools for deciding concrete cases, or as guides for predicting the out-
come of future cases. The tests are not uniform; they are fluctuating;
they are vague; and they are subjective. Nevertheless, if one reads a
large block of cases dealing with mental incompetency, he will probably
conclude that in the great majority of them the courts have reached just
results. This feeling invites inquiry on two scores. Perhaps the judicial
tests of mental incompetency are serviceable tools, despite their apparent
defects. Or perhaps there is an inarticulate standard which, if it does not
actually guide the courts, serves to justify the results at which they have
arrived.
The purpose of the present article is to test these two propositions.
To do so, it will be necessary to delve into the cases and extract the evi-
dentiary facts which courts have deemed most significant in proving a case
of mental incompetency. 17 Each evidentiary fact thus obtained must then
16. Green, Jdicial Tests of Mental Incompetency (1941) 6 Mo. L. REV. 141.
17. There are a number of so-called presumptions regarding mental incompetency.
According to one, a person is presumed to be sane, and the burden of proving the con-
trary is on the one who asserts it. See Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555 (1859) ; Pledger
v. Birkhead, 156 Ark. 443, 246 S. W. 510 (1923) ; In re Sandman's Estate, 121 Cal. App.
9, 8 P. (2d) 499 (1932); Titcomb v. Vantyle, 84 Ill. 371 (1877); Succession of Lam-
bert, 185 La. 416, 169 So. 453 (1936) ; In re Cissel's Estate, 104 Mont. 306, 66 P. (2d)
779 (1937) ; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531 (1863) ; Jennings v. Hennessy, 26 Misc.
265, 55 N. Y. S upp. 833 (Sup. Ct. 1899) ; In re Mason's Estate, 185 Okla. 278, 91 P. (2d)
657 (1939) ; Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of America, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P. (2d) 605 (1937).
This presumption unquestionably applies to capacity to enter into an agreement. See 3
PAGE, CONTRAcrs (2d ed. 1920) 2808; 9 WIGMoRE, EvIDNacE (3d ed. 1940) § 2500. And
according to the weight of authority, it applies also to capacity to execute a will. See
2 PAGE, supra, at 499; 9 WIGMORE, 10c. cit. supra. If insanity of a permanent type is
shown to have once existed, it will be presumed to have continued. See Itt re
Alexander's Estate, 111 Cal. App. 1, 295 Pac. 53 (1931); First Nat. Bank v. Sarvey,
198 Iowa 1067, 198 N. W. 496 (1924) ; 2 PAGE, supra, at 505. This presumption shifts
to the one asserting capacity the burden of showing that there had been a restoration
to reason, or a lucid interval, at the time of the transaction in question. According to
the more accepted view, presumptions are devices for allocating the risk of non-persua-
sion, not evidence. For this reason they are not included in our list of evidentiary facts.
See 9 WIGMORE, supra, at 288 et seq. Contra: In re Mason's Estate, 185 Okla. 278, 91
P. (2d) 657 (1939).
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be scrutinized to determine whether or not it is relevant to the articulate
standard, capacity to understand, and, alternatively, whether or not it is
suggestive of an inarticulate standard.
The evidentiary facts which courts consider relevant to the issue of
mental incompetency cover a wide range. Some of them are directly and
obviously pertinent to the articulate standard, capacity for understanding,
while others seem to have but little probative force on this issue. Much
of the evidence is, on the other hand, apparently directed to determining
whether or not the transaction in question is a fair one rather than
whether or not the alleged incompetent was capable of understanding it.
By Way of anticipation, it may be suggested that many courts seem to
approach the problem in what may seem to be a reverse order; they ap-
pear to judge the transaction first; and only if it is queer, abnormal, or
unfair, do they proceed to the second stage and judge the author of the
transaction.
For convenience in handling, the evidentiary facts of mental incom-
petency will be treated under four rather arbitrary headings: (1) symp-
tomatic conduct of the alleged incompetent; (2) opinion testimony of in-
competency; (3) organic condition and habits of the alleged incompetent;
(4) moral aspects of the transaction and its consequences.18 This classi-
fication is intended to present the evidentiary facts of mental incompetency
in the order of their probative force on the articulate issue, capacity for
understanding. If the hypothesis is correct that the courts are in reality
employing an inarticulate standard calculated to judge the transaction and
not the individual, the above classification presents the facts in inverse
order of their importance.
The operative fact to be proved is mental incompetency-not insanity.
From a medical point of view a person may be mentally ill or insane.
But from a legal point of view, such mental illness or insanity is im-
material, that is, not an operative fact. As an evidential fact, it may give
rise to an inference of mental incompetency, depending upon the type
and severity of the mental illness; but it is well established that mere
proof of mental weakness or insanity is not enough to invalidate an agree-
ment or a will. 9 In order to constitute mental incompetency the mental
18. This classification of evidentiary facts is made merely for convenience of analy-
sis and the categories and sub-categories are not intended to be exclusive of each other.
These are the evidentiary facts which courts have stressed as significant. It is believed
that the list is comprehensive.
19. See Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S. W. (2d) 695 (1936) (feeble mind-
ed); In re Collins' Estate, 174 Cal. 663, 164 Pac. 1110 (1917) (senile dementia); Wil-
lemin v. Dunn, 93 Ill. 511 (1879) (mental weakness); Harrison v. Bishop, 131 Ind. 161,
30 N. E. 1069 (1892) (had been previously adjudicated "of unsound mind") ; In re John-
son's Estate, ?22 Iowa 787, 269 N. AV. 792 (1936) (senile dementia); Nowlen v. Nowlen,
122 Iowa 541, 98 N. NV. 383 (1904) (mental weakness in man over 75); Ellwood v.
O'Brien, 105 Iowa 239, 74 N. NV. 740 (1898) (adjudicated "insane" one week" after
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disorder must be such as to destroy the capacity of the party to under-
stand the questioned transaction in particular.20
SYMPTOMATIC CONDUCT OF THE ALLEGED INCOMPETENT
The only way that mental disorder can manifest itself is through the
behavior of the individual: conduct, speech, gestures, attitudes, and ac-
tivities. Evidence of conduct should be, therefore, the most persuasive
type of evidence. Following the distinction made by many courts, a sub-
division may be made into (a) psychopathic behavior, and (b) conduct
evincing capacity or incapacity to carry on the ordinary affairs of life.
It is upon the former that the medical expert commonly bases his opinion
of incompetency, while the layman commonly bases his opinion chiefly
upon the latter.
Psychopathic behavior. Dean Wigmore has said: "The first and funda-
mental rule, then, will be that any and all conduct of the person is ad-
missible in evidence. There is no restriction as to the kind of conduct.
There can be none; for if a specific act does not indicate insanity it may
indicate sanity. It will certainly throw light one way or the other upon
the issue." 21 This statement should be qualified to the extent that the
conduct must have occurred at or near the time of the transaction in
question. If a person was actually mentally competent when he exe-
cuted the instrument, it is immaterial what his mental condition may have
been before or afterward. However, since mental condition is established
chiefly by means of circumstantial evidence, and since a mental condition
(of health or disorder) is usually a more or less continuous one, evidence
of psychopathic conduct both before and after the event is unquestion-
ably admissible, subject to reasonable limits which are largely in the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.22
contract made) ; Clay v. Clay's Committee, 179 Ky. 494, 200 S. W. 934 (1918) (insane);
Davis v. Phillips, 85 Mich. 198, 48 N. W. 513 (1891) (weak mind) ; In re Cissel's Es-
tate, 104 Mont. 306, 66 P. (2d) 779 (1937) (distinguishes between incompetency and
insanity) ; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531 (1863) (weakness of mind) ; In re Stephani's
Will, 250 App. Div. 253, 294 N. Y. Supp. 624 (3d Dep't 1937) (testator was transferred
from Sing Sing Prison to Dannemora State Hospital on certificate of physician that he
was insane; a will made while there was upheld) ; In re Nightingale's Estate, 182 S. C.
527, 189 S. E. 890 (1937) (mental infirmity); Henderson v. McGregor, 30 Wis. 78
(1872) (mere weakness of understanding is not incompetency) ; Kaleb v. Modern Wood-
men of America, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P. (2d) 605 (1937) (weakness of mind and senile
dementia) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) 754; 1 PAGE, WILLS (1941)
259.
20. Green, supra note 16.
21. 2 WIGIoRE, EVIDENCE, § 228.
22. In re Huston's Estate, 163 Cal. 166, 124 Pac. 852 (1912) ("shortly" before and
"a few weeks" after) ; In re Sandman's Estate, 121 Cal. App. 9, 8 P. (2d) 499 (1932)
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Although mere proof of a few acts of eccentric conduct is not entitled
to much weight,23 the cumulative effect of many acts of eccentric conduct
may be strong evidence of incompetency.2 4 In Lehman s,. Lindenineyer"
the court, afirming a judgment for the contestants in a will contest, averted
to this fact. The acts of eccentric conduct,the cumulative effect of which
was to be strongly persuasive of incompetency, were that the testator,
being a man of means, left his comfortable home, went without necessities,
cooked his own scanty meals, went to live in a squalid mission, and al-
though an uneducated man, became an exhorter. This evidence does in-
dicate psychopathic behavior which may have resulted in a diminution
of testator's capacity for understanding. But another important factor
in the case, according to the court, was that the testator has passed over
the natural objects of his bounty and bestowed his property upon others.
In McDonald's Executors v. McDonald,20 another case in which the ap-
pellate court upheld a judgment for the contestants in a will contest, the
evidence showed that the testator was miserly, mean, and hard to his chil-
dren. His will divided the estate into equal parts and gave each child only
a life estate in his part. They contested. The appellate court said the testa-
tor "unquestionably" had the mind to know his estate and the nature and
value of it, but also said, "It is . . . necessary, in order to have testa-
mentary capacity, for one to have such sensibilities as will enable him to
know the obligations he owes to the natural objects of his bounty. . . ."
On the basis of the usual "understanding" test the case is wrong. The
decision can be explained only by the theory that the court felt the jury
justified in knocking out the will if it was unfair to the children under
all the circumstances of the case. At the other extreme is In re Wright's
Estate,2" in which the lower court denied probate to a will and the ap-
pellate court reversed on the ground there was not sufficient evidence to
prove incompetency, in spite of the facts that the scrivener and both at-
testing witnesses testified that the testator was, in their opinion, of unsound
mind and that the evidence was replete with symptoms of senile dementia:
it showed a personality change after the testator had received a head in-
jury, that he took paper out of garbage cans, pinned it on bushes in the
yard, and said they were roses, etc. The case is certainly out of line if or-
dinary standards of testamentary capacity are used. And if the court was
(ten years before) ; Maher v. Maher, 338 Ill 102, 170 N. E. 221 (1930) ("reasonable"
length of time before and after) ; Edwards v. Miller, 102 Okla. 185, 228 Pac. 1105 (1924)
("great latitude" allowed) ; 2 AVIGMORE, EvrDcE, § 233.
23. See Titcomb v. Vantyle, 84 I1. 371 (1877); Kish v. Balmysa, 330 Pa. 533, 199
AtL 321 (1938).
24. See Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 (1877).
25. 48 Colo. 305, 109 Pac. 956 (1910).
26. 120 Ky. 211, 85 S. V. 1084 (1905).
27. Id. at 217, 85 S. W. at 1035.
28. 7 Cal. (2d) 34, 60 P. (2d) 434 (1936).
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basing its decision on some inarticulate standard, it remained completely
inarticulate.
Personality change, a definite psychopathic symptom, is generally re-
garded as significant evidence by the courts ;2 as are failure of memory,' 0
symptoms of paranoia,3 1 and symptoms of phychoses resulting from the
use of alcohol and drugs.3 2 In many of the cases, the evidence disclosed
also marked symptoms of senile dementia, such as loss of memory, confu-
sion, deterioration of perception, delusions, hallucinations, and personality
change. 3 Certainly, these symptoms should be relevant upon the issue of
impairment of capacity to understand. Many of the courts said that they
were significant, in upholding findings of mental incompetency; but they
also adverted to the fact that the will was an unnatural one under the
circumstances of the case" or to the fact that the agreement was unfair
to the incompetent.35 Conversely, in many of the cases the evidence of
29. See In re Hansen's Estate, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 99, 100 P. (2d) 776 (1940) ; Cald-
well v. Danforth, 124 Conn. 468, 200 Atl. 577 (1938) ; In re Johnson's Estate, 162 Ore.
97, 91 P. (2d) 330 (1939) ; cf. In re Wright's Estate, 7 Cal. (2d) 348, 60 P. (2d) 434
(1936).
30. See Fountain v. Brown, 38 Ala. 72 (1861). See the cases on senile dementia,
note 33 infra; cf. Smith v. Briggs, 171 Md. 528, 189 Atl. 256 (1936).
31. In re Wasserman's Estate, 170 Cal. 101, 148 Pac. 931 (1915) (hallucinations,
delusions of persecution, and ultimately, suicide).
32. Smith v. Salthouse, 147 Kan. 354, 76 P. (2d) 836 (1938); Matter of Kenncy,
179 App. Div. 258, 166 N. Y. Supp. 478 (2d Dep't 1917).
33. See Milton v. Jeffers, 154 Ark. 516, 243 S. W. 60 (1922) (will case, in which
decision for contestants was reversed for new trial because of errors in instructions) ;
It re Hansen's Estate, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 99, 100 P. (2d) 776 (1940) (will case, pro-
bate denied) ; It re Alexander's Estate, 111 Cal. App. 1, 295 Pac. 53 (1931) (will ease,
probate denied) ; Crescio v. Crescio, 365 Ill. 393, 6 N. E. (2d) 628 (1937) (will case,
probate denied); Bordner v. Kelso, 293 Ill. 175, 127 N. E. 337 (1920) (contract case,
lower court rescinded, but appellate court reversed with instructions to dismiss) ; Suther-
land State Bank v. Ferguson, 192 Iowa 1295, 186 N. W. 200 (1922) (contract case,
lower court cancelled, but upper court reversed); Callis v. Thomas, 154 Md. 229, 140
Atl. 59 (1928) (contract case, lower court set aside deed of trust, but appellate court
reversed with instructions to dismiss) ; Clement v. Smith, 293 Mich. 393, 292 N. W. 343
(1940) (contract case, deed and contract set aside); Trimbo v. Trimbo, 47 Minn. 389,
50 N. W. 350 (1891) (contract case, contract upheld) ; Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo.
184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938) (will case, probate denied) ; It re Cissel's Estate, 104
Mont. 306, 66 P. (2d) 779 (1"937) (will case, probate denied) ; Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J.
Eq. 211 (1884) (will case, probate denied); Collins v. Long, 95 Ore. 63, 186 Pac. 1038
(1920) (will case, will sustained); Wigley v. Buzzard, 124 S. W. (2d) 898 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) (contract case, contract set aside); Kaleb v. Modern Woodnien of America,
51 Wyo. 116, 64 P. (2d) 605 (1937) (contract case, contract upheld).
34. See In re Hansen's Estate, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 99, 100 P. (2d) 776 (1940) ; In re
Alexander's Estate, 111 Cal. App. 1, 295 Pac. 53 (1931) ; Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184,
114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938) ; lI re Cissel's Estate, 104 Mont. 306, 66 P. (2d) 779 (1937);
Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J. Eq. 211 (1884).
35. See Clement v. Smith, 293 Mich. 393, 292 N. W. 343 (1940); Wigley v. Buz-
zard, 124 S. W. (2d) 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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senile psychosis was strong, but the court, nevertheless, upheld the trans-
action because it seemed to be a fair and reasonable one under the cir-
cumstances. In Bordner v. Kelso,3" the lower court set aside a contract
and deed; the appellate court reversed, holding that there was not suffi-
cient evidence of mental incompetency. The evidence showed: that the
grantor was ninety-three years old; his sight and hearing were almost
gone; his memory was defective; he had delusions that his family were
taking his money; he was confused, frequently arising and dressing at
midnight, thinking it was morning; he depended on others to read, write,
and exchange money for him; at times he did not understand what was
said to him and could not carry on a connected conversation. The court
held that this evidence was insufficient to sustain the finding of the lower
court. It mentions the fact that the bargain was a fair one, that it was
explained to the grantor by the cashier in the bank, and that the grantor
made no objection to it in his lifetime. If the bargain had been an unfair
one, and if the grantor had not had independent advice concerning it, it is
possible that the court might have arrived at a different conclusion.
In Collins v. Long,3 the lower court refused probate to a will, but the
appellate court reversed, holding the testator competent. The testator
had two children, Ada and John, by a first marriage, and six by a second
marriage. Ada was driven away from home when she was seventeen.
About thirty-five years later the testator relented and became friendly with
her again. His will gave most of his property to Ada and John. The
second wife and her children were the contestants. The evidence on be-
half of the contestants showed that the testator was ninety-four years old
when he made the will, that three years previously he had been adjudicated
an incompetent and a guardian appointed for him, that he was very forget-
ful, his memory was bad, he would fail to recognize old acquaintances
or familiar places, that he was confused, that he tapped on the walls with
his cane to "drive out the ghosts," and that his conduct was otherwise
peculiar. There was, of course, opinion evidence introduced by the pro-
ponents that he was competent, and to the effect that lie favored Ada in
the will because he wanted to right the wrong he had done her. The ap-
pellate court held him competent. Although it did not expressly say so,
it apparently approved of his "natural" instinct to atone for his past wrong
by rewarding Ada. If the testator had given the bulk of his property to
a stranger or to one with whom he had been having illicit relations, it is
doubtful if the decision of the appellate court would have been the same.38
36. 293 Ill. 175, 127 N. E. 337 (1920).
37. 95 Ore. 63, 186 Pac. 1038 (1920); see also Trimbo v. Trimbo, 47 Minn. 3S9,
50 N. W. 350 (1891).
38. Compare In re Wasserman's Estate, 170 Cal. 101, 148 Pac. 931 (1915) ; In re
Alex-ander's Estate, 111 Cal. App. 1, 295 Pac. 53 (1931); Howe v. Richards, 112 Iow.a
220, 83 N. W. 909 (1900).
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Mental incompetency can never be proved without introducing some
evidence of psychopathic behavior. It is unsafe, however, to assume that
the case is won, merely because there is in the record strong evidence of
psychotic conduct. Even if a jury brings in a verdict on the basis of such
evidence, appellate courts will find a way to set it aside if they feel other
circumstances warrant it. Sometimes their action is e.xplainable on the
theory that they are following an inarticulate standard; sometimes it is
not; but, in any case, it is apparent that the understanding test is not rig-
idly applied.
Delusions are symptomatic of many type of mental disorder and, to-
gether with other evidence of psychopathic conduct, may lead the fact
trier to find that the person involved lacks the necessary capacity for
understanding requisite to competency. Psychiatrists would agree with
this analysis. They would not agree, however, with the well-established
legal doctrine of the so-called insane delusion, the theory that a person
may be perfectly normal except on one subject as to which he entertains
a so-called "insane delusion." If the insane delusion motivated the trans-
action, it invalidates it.3" This may be regarded as a special application of
the understanding test, namely, that the person is incapable of under-
standing the transaction because of his insane delusion affecting it. Or
it may be regarded as a case of improper motivation, in which case it is
supplementary to the understanding test.4" The will cases offer the best
examples of insane delusions. Many of the delusions in these cases are
delusions of marital infidelity (common in senile dementia) .41 Some take
the form of an irrational dislike for some member of the family,42 while
others are delusions regarding spiritual directions as to the disposition
of the testator's property.43 Where the delusion is one of marital infidelity
resulting in virtual disinheritance of the surviving spouse, courts fre-
quently fortify a finding of incompetency by regarding the disposition
made by the will as unnatural.44 The same technique is employed where
the delusion manifests itself in an irrational antagonism toward a son
39. See In re Sandman's Estate, 121 Cal. App. 9, 8 P. (2d) 499 (1932) ; Meigs v.
Dexter, 172 Mass. 217, 52 N. E. 75 (1898); Riggs v. Am. Tract Soc., 95 N. Y. 503
(1884); Irwin v. Lattin, 29 S. D. 1, 135 N. W. 759 (1912); 1 WILLISTON. CONTRACTS,
754; 1 PAGE, WILLs, 289 et seq.
40. See Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency-a Study int Re-
lated Concepts (1943) 43 CoL. L. REv. 176.
41. See Bnrkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 24 N. E. 118 (1890); In re Kaven's
Estate, 279 Mich. 334, 272 N. W. 696 (1937).
42. See In re Huston's Estate, 163 Cal. 166, 124 Pac. 852 (1912) ; Davis v. Davis, 64
Colo. 62, 170 Pac. 208 (1918) ; Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J. Eq. 211 (1884).
43. In re Willits' Estate, 175 Cal. 173, 165 Pac. 537 (1917) ; In re Sandman's Estate,
121 Cal. App. 9, 8 P. (2d) 499 (1932) ; Orcbardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14, 49 N. E. 197
(1897); Irwin v. Lattin, 29 S. D. 1, 135 N. W. 759 (1912).
44. See cases cited supra note 41.
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or daughter." Deeds and contracts are sometimes set aside on the ground
that they were motivated by an insane delusion ;4 and here, also, there is
a tendency for the court to add by way of justification that the contract
was an unnatural one under the circumstances."
Conduct evincing capacity or incapacity to carry on the ordinary affairs
of life. A few courts have framed their standards for determining mental
incompetency upon the basis of one's ability to carry on the ordinary
affairs of life." Such courts would be bound by their own definitions
of incompetency to give weight to evidence tending to show ability or
inability to transact ordinary business. 49  Most courts construct their
standards along different lines."0 Under any type of standard, however,
evidence of the capacity or incapacity of the individual to transact the
ordinary business of life is admissible and has evidentiary value.
Thus courts upholding agreements attacked upon the ground of the
mental incompetency of one of the parties have frequently stressed the
fact that the alleged incompetent had capacity to transact the ordinary
business of life,"' sometimes giving more weight to this element than to
any other.52 Contrariwise, in holding that an agreement was invalid be-
45. See Davis v. Davis, 64 Colo. 62, 170 Pac. 208 (191S); Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J.
Eq. 211 (1884).
46. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 360 Ill. 101, 195 N. E. 521 (1935); Riggs %. Am. Tract
Soc., 95 N. Y. 503 (1884).
47. See Eubanks v. Eubanks, 360 Il1. 101, 195 N. E. 521 (1935).
48. See Perry v. Pearson, 135 Ill. 218, 224, 25 N. E. 636, 637 (1890) ; Titcomb v.
VanTyle, 84 Ill. 371, 374 (1887); Baldwin v. Dunton, 40 11. 188, 193 (1866); Green,
mipra note 16, at 146-57.
49. See In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal. (2d) 573, 107 P. (2d) 25 (1940) ; Titcomb
v. VanTyle, 84 Ill. 371 (1877).
50. The usual standard is framed in terms of the capacity of the party to understand
the transaction in question. See Green, supra note 16.
51. See Parker v. larco, 76 Fed. 510 (C. C. D. S. C. 1896) ; Callis v. Thomas, 154
Mfd. 229, 140 Atl. 59 (1928): Byrd v. McKoy, 183 Okla. 209, 81 P. (2d) 315 (138):
'McFarland v. Ellingsworth, 159 Ore. 446, 80 P. (2d) S99 (1938).
52. In Pledger v. Birkhead, 156 Ark. 443, 450, 246 S. NV. 510, 513 (1923), where
the evidence on competency was sharply conflicting and three doctors had testified that the
grantor of the deeds was incompetent, the supreme court reversed the lower court, which
had cancelled the deeds. In so doing it relied upon the fact that witnesses who knew the
grantor well over long periods of time testified that he "had judgment and business ca-
pacity to attend to the ordinary affairs of a small farmer such as he v'as," that he too!;
an interest in local public affairs, voted at elections, displayed partisan preferences, took
an active interest in church life, was often called upon to lead in prayer, was an elder of
the church, a member of a lodge and held an office therein, had memorized the ritual of
the lodge, served on the regular panel of the petit jury, etc. In Somers v. Pumphrey,
24 Ind. 231 (1865), the supreme court reversed the lower court's finding of incompetency,
relying largely upon the fact that grantor could cook,, sew, keep house, write her name,
and perform the usual duties of a daughter and a wife. See also Jackson v. King, 4 Cow.
207 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (capacity to manage a farm).
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cause of mental incompetency, courts have frequently relied upon the in-
ability of the party involved to carry on the ordinary business affairs of
life.53 A similar generalization can be made in will contests. Evidence
that the testator had capacity to carry on the ordinary business of life has
been considered strongly persuasive of testamentary capacity ;14 and evi-
dence that the testator was incapable of carrying on the ordinary business
of life, strongly persuasive of lack of testamentary capacity."
The relevancy and probative effect of this particular element is much
more clearly appreciated when mental disorder is viewed from the psychi-
atric approach, that is, the non-integration or disorganization of an indi-
vidual with his social environment."0 And, in a broad sense, incapacity
to transact ordinary business might be subsumed under the first heading
of psychopathic behavior. It is given separate treatment here because
courts seem to give it an added significance. They seem to feel that it is
unjust to hold a person bound by his transactions when he has demon-
strated a pronounced inability to stand upon a plane of comparative equali-
ty with his fellow members of society, especially when the transaction in
question is so contrary to the institutional pattern of similar transactions
that the court views it as one grossly unfair to the alleged incompetent
or his dependents. This evidentiary fact standing alone is, however, in-
conclusive; it must be found in conjunction with other evidentiary facts
of incompetency to become strongly persuasive.
OPINION TESTIMONY OF INCOMPETENCY
Opinion testimony of incompetency is of three types: lay opinion,
expert opinion, and official opinion, the latter being found in a court's
adjudication of incompetency. Since all opinion evidence of incompetency
is based upon the conduct of the alleged incompetent, it is in a very real
sense secondary evidence; hence, its probative value should not be as great
53. See Thatcher v. Kramer, 347 IIl. 601, 180 N. E. 434 (1932) (here the evidence
showed that the grantor had been shamefully imposed upon in other transactions) ; Schultz
v. Oldenburg, 202 Minn. 237, 277 N. W. 918 (1938) ; Henderson v. McGregor, 30 Wis.
78 (1872).
54. See In re Collins' Estate, 174 Cal. 663, 164 Pac. 1110 (1917) ; Guarantee Trust
and Safe Deposit Co. v. Heidenreich, 290 Pa. 249, 138 Atl. 764 (1927) ; Melody v. Hamb-
lin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 115 S. W. (2d) 237 (1937) ; In re McGhee's Estate, 188 Wash.
550, 62 P. (2d) 1336 (1936).
55. See Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555 (1859) ; Milton v. Jeffers, 154 Ark. 516, 243
S. W. 60 (1922) ; Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 197, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035, 1042 (1938),
wherein the court upholding a verdict for the contestant refers to some of the facts, that
"Testator was unable to understand that he had paid for a load of wood; that he sold
corn on credit for 50 cents a bushel, and for 60 cents cash; that he, without trying to
collect, traded an $18 note for a $2 pig; and that he paid $95 for a $15 mule."
56. LANDIS AND PAGE, Op. cit. supra note 8, at 8 et seq.; Green, Public Policies
Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency (1940) 38 Micn. L. REV. 1189, 1197-1200.
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as the evidence discussed under the first heading. Expert opinion should
possess a very high degree of probative value, however, since conduct
without interpretation is meaningless, and since medical experts are in
a position to furnish the most valid interpretations.
Lay opinion of incompetency. The attesting witnesses to a will always
have been permitted to testify as to their opinion regarding the mental
competency of the testator. Part of their function as attesting witnesses
is to satisfy themselves that he is competent. Most attesting witnesses do
no such thing, but their opinion is nevertheless received in evidence. T
Also, the rules of evidence in all jurisdictions permit any lay witness to
give his opinion of a person's mental competency." The ordinary lay vAt-
ness must also divulge the facts upon which lie bases his opinion. If he
does not lay the foundation for his opinion on direct examination by de-
tailing the facts upon which it is based, they may be ferreted out of him on
cross-examination.59 Granting that lay opinion of mental inco'mpetency
is admissible in evidence, the question remains: how potent is it? In
answering this question, it should be borne in mind that we are dealing
with lay opinion. Courts assume that anyone is capable of forming an
opinion as to the mental competency of another and that no special
qualifications are needed,e0 provided that the opinion is based upon facts
observed. Hence, the more data that a witness details as the basis for
his opinion and the better is his opportunity for observation, the more
convincing should be his opinion. Nevertheless, because it is simply a
lay opinion, courts assume that a judge should be able to form his own
opinion on the same evidence; and if it is at variance with the opinion of
the witness, to place little reliance upon the latter. There is one flaw in this
logic. The whole is sometimes greater than the sum of its parts. A Rem-
brandt painting may consist of a wooden frame, a piece of canvas, and
certain pigments in oil; yet, it is more than the sum of these; it is the
intangible which distinguishes it from any other picture. A witness
may try to detail all of the facts upon which he bases his opinion,
but these facts do not represent the whole picture. The general impression
of incompetency may be produced by the facts detailed plus intangibles
which the witness is unable to put into words. Courts, nevertheless, fre-
quently say that such an opinion can rise no higher than the facts upon
57. 3 WIG M oi, EvmEicE, § 689; 7 id., § 1936.
58. "Of the state of the law in the various jurisdictions, it is enough to note in gen-
eral that laymen's opinions are today everywhere conceded to be admissible, subject to
local qualifications and quibbles." 7 id. § 1938. However, for his opinion to be admissible
the witness must have fulfilled the requirement of knowledge, that is, it must be shown
that he had an opportunity by observation to learn enough about the person to form an
opinion as to his mental condition. 3 id., § 689.
59. 7 Id., §§ 1922, 1935.
60. The only requisite is opportunity for observation. See note 58 supra.
194,41
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
which it is based." And while courts sometimes rely upon such opinion
evidence," they often brush it aside. One technique is to say that the facts
did not justify the opinion ;13 another is to say that the incompetency must
exist at the exact moment when the instrument was executed and that
the opinions of the witnesses related to another time.04 Lower courts in
both will " and contract 66 cases often make findings of incompetency
which appellate courts set aside on the ground that they are unsupported
by the evidence, in spite of the presence of quantities of lay opinion of
incompetency.
Expert opinrion of incompetency. The expert opinion is similar to the
lay opinion in that both must be based upon facts. It differs from the lay
opinion in two respects. The expert need not obtain his data by direct
observation (although he often does); it may be furnished to him by
others, usually through the device of the hypothetical question." He is
supposed to be possessed of special qualifications which enable him to give
an expert opinion. One might suppose that, because he is an expert in
mental disorders, his opinion on incompetency should be entitled to more
weight than the opinion of the man in the street or the man on the farm.
However, the courts seem to feel otherwise. While there are courts which
treat such expert opinion with deference," by and large the courts have
been notoriously discourteous to the medical expert who gives an opinion
on incompetency. Case after case can be found where an appellate court
reversed a lower court's finding of incompetency on the ground it was
unsupported by the evidence in spite of the fact that the record contained
expert opinion evidence of incompetency. 9 It has been held error to in-
61. See Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S. W. (2d) 695 (1936) ; M'Daniel's
Will, 2 J. J. Mar. 331 (Ky. 1829).
62. See Milton v. Jeffers, 154 Ark. 516, 243 S. W. 60 (1922); Matter of Forsyth,
169 Misc. 1042, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 642 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
63. See cases cited supra note 61.
64. See In re McGhee's Estate, 188 Wash. 550, 62 P. (2d) 1336 (1936).
65. See In re Wright's Estate, 7 Cal. (2d) 348, 60 P. (2d) 434 (1935) ; Jackson's
Ex'r v. Semones, 266 Ky. 352, 98"S. W. (2d) 505 (1936) ; Greer's Ex'r v. Bishop, 265
Ky. 352, 96 S. W. (2d) 851 (1936) ; Smith v. Biggs, 171 Md. 528, 189 Ati. 256 (1937)
In re Potter's Will, 248 App. Div. 808, 289 N. Y. Supp. 770 (4th Dep't 1936).
66. See Johnson v. Lane, 369 Ill. 135, 15 N. E. (2d) 710 (1938) ; Bordner v. KIel.o,
293 Ill. 175, 127 N. E. 337 (1920) ; Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Chisholm, 71 Iowa 675, 33
N. W. 234 (1887).
67. 2 WiGm Oa, EvIDENCE, § 672 et seq.
68. See In re Behrend's Will, 227 Iowa 1099, 290 N. W. 78 (1940) ; In re Frazier's
Estate, 131 Neb. 61, 267 N. W. 181 (1936) ; Matter of Forsyth, 169 Misc. 1042, 9 N. Y.
S. (2d) 642 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Oglesby v. Harris, 130 S. W. (2d) 449 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939).
69. See Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S. W. (2d) 695 (1936) ; In re Arnold's
Estate, 16 Cal. (2d) 573, 107 P. (2d) 25 (1940) ; In re Collins' Estate, 174 Cal. 663, 164
Pac. 1110 (1917); Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Chisholm, 71 Iowa 675, 33 N. W. 234
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struct a jury that it might give more weight to expert testimony than to
lay.7" Courts have occasionally stigmatized expert testimony of incom-
petency as the "weakest and most unsatisfactory" kind of evidence"1
or as "valueless:" 12 It has been said judicially that expert opinion, like
lay opinion, can rise no higher than the facts upon which it is based ;"3
and courts have not hesitated to substitute their opinions for those of the
melical expert, especially where they considered the transaction to be
a normal and natural one under the circumstances." This is really an
extraordinary situation if the real inquiry is into the capacity of the in-
dividual to understand. Vho better than an expert in mental disorders
is qualified to give an answer to this inquiry? What possible explanation
can be found for this judicial attitude? Surely it is not a carry-over of
the college rivalry between the laws and the medics.
The reputation of psychiatry as a science has suffered because of its
connection with the criminal courts. In an important murder trial, where
the defense is insanity, it is a more or less common spectacle for a group
of psychiatrists of equal eminence to be lined up on each side of the case.
This creates a tendency in the judicial mind to view their opinions with
suspicion. This suspicion is not removed by the fact that a case happens
to fall on the civil rather than the criminal side of the docket. It is, like-
wise, not uncommon for groups of equally eminent psychiatrists to be
lined up on either side of an important will contest." This tends to con-
(1887); Greer's Ex'r v. Bishop, 265 Ky. 352, 96 S. NV. (2d) 851 (1936); Callis v.
Thomas, 154 Md. 229, 140 Ati. 59 (1928); Stevens v. Meadows, 340 Mo. 252, 10 S. W.
(2d) 281 (1936) ; Guarantee Trust Co. v. Heidenreich, 290 Pa. 249. 138 Ati. 764 (1927).
70. In re Cookson's Estate, 325 Pa. 81, 128 AtI. 904 (1937).
71. In re Collins' Estate, 174 Cal. 663, 670, 164 Pac. 1110, 1113 (1917).
72. Davis v. Phillips, 85 Mich. 198, 203, 48 N. NV. 513, 514 (1S91).
73. See Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S. IV. (2d) 695 (1936) ; In re Arnold's
Estate, 16 Cal. (2d) 573, 107 P. (2d) 25 (1940); Guarantee Trust Co. v. Heidenreich,
290 Pa. 249, 13S Atl. 764 (1927).
74. See In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal. (2d) 573, 107 P. (2d) 25 (1940) ; In re Col-
lins' Estate, 174 Cal. 663, 164 Pac. 1110 (1917); In re Mason's Estate, 185 Okla. 278,
91 P. (2d) 657 (1939).
75. Professor Folsom, Professor Emeritus, University of Coloradu Law Schoul,
suggests that the conflict in opinions of psychiatrists in such cases may nt be as great
as it appears because of the possibility that the hypothetical questiuns propounded to
them may differ: that is, precisely the same question is not propuunded tW the experts
on each side; hence, they are giving opinions on different sets of facts. H .wever, thir,
does not account for the fact that their opinions are seldom shaken on cross-examina-
tion. Even if the explanation is valid, it is not sufficiently apparent to dissulve the sus-
picion generated by such battles of the experts. Some have suggested that the problem
could be solved in the criminal law field by having the mental condition of the accused
determined by an impartial expert or board of experts appointed by the court, for exam-
ple, a state psychiatrist. Whatever merit such a system would have in criminal law,
it is submitted that it would not solve the problem in suits between private litigants.
In will contests the testator is dead at the time of the trial and, therefore, not subject
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firm the suspicion. Possibly this is the explanation of judicial disregard
for expert opinion, but in the light of a similar judicial disregard for
other evidentiary facts of mental incompetency, the possibility of an in-
articulate standard cannot be ignored.
Official opinion of incompetency (prior or subsequent adjudications).
Proceedings for the adjudication of a person as an incompetent are of
two types. The more common type, which stems from the common law
writ, de lunatico inquirendo, has for its primary purpose the appoint-
ment of a guardian to care for and preserve the incompetent's estate.
The second type, summary in nature, has for its purpose the protection of
the person of the incompetent by confining him in an asylum or hospital. 7'
The general rule is that a judgment or decree of incompetency in either
type of proceeding is admissible in evidence in another suit wherein the
incompetent or his representative is a party, whether the adjudication
was made prior or subsequent to the transaction in question.77 In some
jurisdictions a decree of adjudication of the first type will render subse-
quent contracts void. 8 With this exception the decree of adjudication,
whether made prior or subsequent to the transaction, is merely an evi-
dentiary fact of incompetency to be considered with all others. An as
evidentiary fact, it is highly inconclusive. This is not surprising in regard
to subsequent adjudications, as they are not retroactive in their operation.
But it is mildly disturbing to find courts upholding and enforcing agree-
ments and wills made at a time when the author of the instrument was
under guardianship or in a hospital for the insane."0 Nevertheless, the
to examination by the state psychiatrist. The same situation prevails in many contract
cases. The state, moreover, is a party to a criminal trial and may require a state psy-
chiatrist to present its side of the case, but the state is not a party to private litigation.
For other suggested methods as to the solution of the problem, see note 132 infra.
76. 5 WGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1671; (1914) 14 COL. L. REV. 674.
77. The cases are collected in an excellent annotation in (1920) 7 A. L. R, 568, sup-
plemented by (1930) 68 A. L. R. 1309. See also 5 WItGMORE, 10C. cit. supra note 76.
78. See Green, The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and
Wills (1943) 21 TEX. L. REV. 554.
79. Agreements: Mason v. Graves, 265 S. W. 667 (Ark. 1924) (under guardian-
ship); Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 128 Mich. 110, 87 N. W. 81 (1901) (prior commitment
to asylum-deed made during lucid interval when grantor was 87) ; Finch v. Goldstein,
245 N. Y. 300, 157 N. E. 146 (1927) (conveyance made while in hospital for insane pursuant
to commitment). Wills: In re Johnson's Estate, 57 Cal. 529 (1881) (under guardian-
ship; lower court sustained will and appellate court affirmed); In re Johnson's Estate,
222 Iowa 787, 269 N. W. 792 (1936) (testator, aged 74, filed voluntary petition to have
his brother appointed his guardian one year prior to execution of will; lower court denied
probate, but appellate court reversed) ; McLoughlin v. Sheehan, 250 Mass. 132, 145 N. E.
259 (1924) (under conservatorship; lower court sustained will and appellate court af-
firmed) ; Rice v. Rice, 50 Mich. 448, 15 N. W. 545 (1883) (guardianship proceedings
pending when will executed, and guardian actually appointed a few hours after will was
signed; lower court denied probate, but appellate court reversed holding lower court
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decree of adjudication seems to stand upon the same plane, as far as pro-
bative value is concerned, as psychopathic behavior and both lay and expert
opinions of incompetency.
ORGANIC CONDITION AND HABITS OF THE ALLEGED INCOMPETENT
Under this heading are subsumed four evidentiary facts: age, bodily
infirmity and disease, the use of drugs and alcohol, and illiteracy. The
first three may be considered circumstantial evidence of incompetency;
standing alone they are equivocal, but coupled with other facts they may
give rise to an inference of incompetency. The fourth is even more
equivocal; per se it proves nothing, but it may be one of a number of facts
tending to prove mental deficiency. In relation to the articulate standard
the probative value of the facts in this group should be less than that of
the facts in the two preceding groups.
Age. "As human beings pass into the old-age decades, there occurs a
failure of the mental powers which, in general is commensurate with the
physical deteriorations of senility . . . .When we speak of senility and
senile psychoses, we refer to those mental disturbances which occur, as
a general rule, after sixt3-five . , 8
erred in instructing jury that the adjudication of incompetency %%-as prima facie evidence
of lack of testamentary capacity, which shifted the burden of proof to proponents) ; : re
Stephani's Vill, 250 App. Div. 253, 294 N. Y. Supp. 624 (3d Dep't 1937) (testator, certi-
fied as insane by a physician, spent last thirty-two years of his life in Dannemora Prison,
a special prison for convicts, and made the will after he had been there 16 years; lower
court refused probate, but appellate court reversed with directions to admit the will
to probate); Lena v. Patterson, 113 Okla. 156, 242 Pac. 238 (1925) (under guardian-
ship; lower court sustained will, and appellate court affirmed) ; Collins v. Long, 95 Ore-
63, 186 Pac. 1038 (1920) (under guardianship; probate court denied probate; on appeal
to circuit court the will was upheld, and the supreme court affirmed); In re Draper's
Estate, 215 Pa. 314, 64 Atl. 520 (1906) (will made after testator had been committed
to insane asylum and had been there many years; lower court refused to submit issue
of incompetency to jury and granted probate, and appellate court affirmed) ; In re Bean's
Estate, 159 Wis. 67, 149 N. NV. 745 (1914) (will made while guardianship proceedings
were pending, which later resulted in appointment of guardian; lower court denied pro-
bate, but appellate court reversed with directions to admit the will) ; Will of Slinger v.
Calverly, 72 Wis. 22, 37 N. V. 236 (1888) (under guardianship; a jury found mental
incompetency, but the lower court entered a judgment n.o.v. admitting the will; the
appellate court held the finding of incompetency not supported by the evidence, but re-
versed because it thought undue influence had been proved). The rationale behind many
of the decisions is expressed in Breed v. Pratt, 35 Mass. 115, 116 (Pick. 1836): "It
[making a will] is an act manifestly distinguishable from contracts and other acts to
be done inter vkvos, and involves no conflict of authority with the guardian in this respect.
because the will cannot operate to any purpose, till the death of the testator, and by that
same event, the authority of the guardian is determined."
80. SADLm, op. cit. .ipra note 1, at 909.
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Mental deterioration is not a matter of mere chronological age. There
are wide individual variations. Some men are old at forty, while others
retain a great deal of their physical and mental vigor after they have
passed their allotted three score and tern." The late Mr. Justice Holmes
is a striking illustration of the fact that mere old age does not necessarily
result in loss of mental power. A recognition of this fact has led to
numerous statements that extreme old age does not of itself disqualify a
person from making a valid agreement or will." Many cases can be found
upholding agreements and wills made by persons in advanced years.83
However, old age becomes an important evidentiary fact when found in
connection with other evidentiary facts of incompetency. 84 It has been
held proper so to instruct a jury. 5 Both in the contract cases "' and in
the will cases 8 courts very often stress, or at least mention, the extreme
81. HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 343 ct seq.
82. 3 PAGE, CONTRACTS, 2807; 1 SHOULER, WILLS (6th ed. 1923) 180; TIIOMPSON,
WILLS (2d ed. 1936) 88.
83. See, e.g., Calveard v. Reynolds, 281 Ky. 518, 136 S. W. (2d) 795 (1940)
(deed of 83 year old grantor) ; Murphy v. Lester, 280 Ky. 51, 132 S. W. (2d) 542 (1939)
(contract of 95 year old man) ; Collins v. Long, 95 Ore. 63, 186 Pac. 1038 (1920) (will
of 94 year old testator) ; Kish v. Bakaysa, 330 Pa. 533, 199 Atl. 321 (1938) (will of "a
disagreeable old man"); Buckey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168, 18 S. E. 383 (1893) (deed
of 87 year old grantor).
84. 2 PAGE, WILLS, 565.
85. Whitsett v. Belue, 172 Ala. 256, 54 So. 677 (1911) ; Rutland v. Gleaves and
Thompson, 31 Tenn. 198 (1851).
86. See Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42, 188 So. 867 (1939) (age, 87); Hawkins v.
Randolph, 149 Ark. 124, 231 S. W. 566 (1921) (age, over 80); Campbell v. Lux, 146
Ark. 397, 225 S. W. 653 (1920) (age, 77); Saliba v. James, 143 Fla. 404, 196 So. 832
(1940) (age, 70) ; Willemin v. Dunn, 93 I1. 511 (1879) (age, 75) ; Layne v. Layne, 277
Ky. 295, 126 S. W. (2d) 416 (1939) (age, 83) ; Griffin v. Mays, 183 Okla. 350, 82 P.
(2d) 836 (1938) (age, past 90); Wigley v. Buzzard, 124 S. W. (2d) 898 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) (age, over 80). Where the issue of mental incompetency is combined with
undue influence, age is likewise treated as significant. See Payne v. Payne, 12 Cal. App.
251, 107 Pac. 148 (1910) (age, over 79) ; Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 284 N. W.
397 (1939) (age, 87); Clement v. Smith, 293 Mich. 393, 292 N. W. 343 (1940) (age,
over 70). And, similarly, where the issue of mental incompetency is combined with
fraud. See Sunseri v. Katz, 53 Ariz. 234, 87 P. (2d) 797 (1939) (age, over 80) ; Richey
v. Crabtree, 198 Ark. 25, 127 S. W. (2d) 269 (1939) ("quite old") ; Douglas v. Ogle,
80 Fla. 42, 85 So. 243 (1920) ("old" and "aged") ; Mettetal v. Hall, 288 Mich. 200, 284
N. W. 698 (1939) (age, 77).
87. See Whitsett v. Belue, 172 Ala. 256, 54 So. 677 (1911) (approving instruction
to jury allowing them to consider "old age" on the issue of mental incompetency) ; Mil-
ton v. Jeffers, 154 Ark. 516, 243 S. W. 60 (1922) (age, 92) ; In re Alexander's Estate,
111 Cal. App. 1, 295 Pac. 53 (1931) (age, 97) ; Crescio v. Crescio, 365 Ill. 393, 6 N. E.
(2d) 628 (1937) (age, 78) ; In re Behrend's Will, 227 Iowa 1099, 290 N. W. 78 (1940)
(age, 75) ; Howe v. Richards, 112 Iowa 220, 83 N. W. 909 (1900) (age, 81) ; Loving's
Adm'r v. Williamson, 274 Ky. 571, 119 S. W. (2d) 651 (1938) (age, 71); Proffer v.
Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938) (age, 75); Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J.
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age of the party as one of the considerations moving them to hold the
contract or will invalid. Age as an evidentiary fact is satisfactory in that
it is definite, certain, concrete, and objective. While standing alone it is
utterly equivocal as to its implications, as one of a group of evidentiary
facts it has a tendency to lend color to the others.
Bodily infirmity and disease. Medical science no longer regards the mind
as an entity, independent of the corporeal body. It is at least physio-
logically conditioned.8 s Some mental disorders, such as general paresis
and the psychoses of senility, are definitely traceable to lesions in the central
nervous system. Others, it is believed, are due to bacterial toxins. In all
general infections, especially if accompanied by a high fever, symptoms
of delirium, stupor, and even mania may be present.8 Severe trauma may
produce shock and hysteria. 0 All of these have a tendency to diminish or
extinguish, at least temporarily, capacity for understanding. Of course,
not every disease or infirmity will have mental sequelae; and it is generally
agreed, therefore, that mere illness or bodily infirmity will not disqualify
a person from making a valid agreement "1 or will. 2 But they may be
potent evidentiary facts.-3 In the leading case, Allore v. Jcwell," the heir
Eq. 211 (1884) (age, 80) ; Matter of Forsyth, 169 Misc. 1042, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 642 (Surr.
Ct. 1938) (age, 75); In re Morey's Will, 254 App. Div. 713, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 125 (3d
Dep't 1938) (age, 73); Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 115 S. W. (2d) 237
(1937) ("old age'); Rutland Y. Gleaves and Thompson, 31 Tenn. 193 (1851) (evidence
conflicting on age, ranging from 60 to 73) ; Oglesby v. Harris, 130 S. V. (2d) 449 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939) (age, 71); In re McCoy's Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P. (2d) 020 (1937)
(age, 92) ; In re Landgren's Estate, 189 Wash. 33, 63 P. (2d) 438 (1936) (age, 79).
88. HAr, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INSANITY (4th ed. 1931) 24; JAcon , TIa UNSOUND
,IxND AND THE LAw (1918) 20, 33.
89. HENDERSON AND GrusPiE, op. cit. supra note 5, 61
90. Id. at 66.
91. See Borovansky v. Para, 306 111. App. 60, 2S N. E. (2d) 174 (1940) (here the
grantor had diabetes, arteriosclerosis, and myocarditis) ; Calveard v. Reynolds, 281 Ky.
518, 136 S. V. (2d) 795 (1940); 'Murphy v. Lester, 280 Ky. 51, 132 S. W. (2d1 542
(1939) ; Kirk v. Tacket, 134 Neb. 759, 279 N. W. 468 (1938) ; 3 PAE, Courmcr. ;, 2 07.
See Johnson v. Lane, 369 Ill. 135, 15 N. E. (2d) 710 (1938).
92. See Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938) ; Kish v. Ba-
kaysa, 330 Pa. 533, 199 At. 321 (1938); 1 PAGE, WILLs, 311-13.
93. Cases involving agreements: Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 (1877); Richey
v. Crabtree, 198 Ark. 25, 127 S. AV. (2d) 269 (1939) (grantor had pellagra and was
"quite feeble") ; Campbell v. Lux, 146 Ark. 397, 225 S. W. 653 (1920) (chronic diarrhea
and bladder trouble, which impaired health to a great extent) ; Boyd v. Boyd, 123 Ark.
134, 184 S. W. 838 (1916) (in extremes, dying from cancer); Willemin v. Dunn, 93 IM.
511 (1879) (great grief and sickness after losing his wife); Allen v. Francis, 277 Ky.
20, 125 S. W. (2d) 211 (1939) (paralytic stroke); Layne v. Layne, 277 Ky. 295, 126
S. NV. (2d) 416 (1939) ("feeble and infirm both in body and mind"); Beattie v. Bower,
290 Mlich. 517, 287 N. NV. 900 (1939) (epilepsy and arteriosclerosis); Taylor v. Martin,
125 N. J. Eq. 156, 4 A. (2d) 690 (1939) (in hospital, ill with pneumonia); Griffin v.
Mays, 183 Okla. 350, 82 P. (2d) 836 (1938) (bedfast from paralytic stroke, also senile
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at law of the deceased grantor sued to set aside a conveyance made when
the grantor was extremely ill. The lower court dismissed the bill. The
United States Supreme Court reversed with directions to enter a decree
for the plaintiff. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Field, the Court, after
detailing considerable evidence tending to prove incompetency, stated:
"In view of the circumstances stated, we are not satisfied that the
deceased was, at the time she executed the conveyance, capable of
comprehending fully the nature and effect of the transaction. She
was in a state of physical prostration; and from that cause, and her
previous infirmities, aggravated by her sickness, her intellect was
greatly enfeebled; and, if not dlisqualified, she was unfitted to attend
to business of such importance as the disposition of her entire prop-
erty, and the securing of an annuity for life. Certain it is, that, in
negotiating for the disposition of the property, she stood, in her
sickness and infirmities, on no terms of equality with the defendant,
who, with his attorney and agent, met her alone in her hovel to ob-
tain the conveyance." 95
dementia); Wigley v. Buzzard, 124 S. W. (2d) 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (very feeble).
Will cases: McCartney v. Holmquist, 106 F. (2d) 855, 856 (App. D. C. 1939) [extremely
ill with arteriosclerosis, cancer of pancreas, hardening of liver and kidneys, gallstones, and
enlargement of the heart. The court said: "Enfeebled physical condition may be consid-
ered evidence of testamentary incapacity."]; Whitsett v. Belue, 172 Ala. 256, 259, 54 So.
677, 679 (1911) (where court approves an instruction to the jury that in determining
the issue of mental incompetency they might consider "the condition of testatrix, her
mental and physical condition at the time, whether she was confined to her bed, and
whether her will power and independence of mind were subdued and weakened by mor-
phine and sickness and old age.") ; In re Doolittle's Estate, 153 Cal. 29, 30, 94 Pac. 2,10,
24f (1908) (in a dying condition from pneumonia-"an exceedingly weak and feeble
condition physically") ; Caldwell v. Danforth, 124 Conn. 468, 200 Atl. 577 (1938) (a com-
plication of diseases, the most serious being anaemia and tumor; the will was made in
the hospital the day before the testator died) ; Crescio v. Crescio, 365 II. 393, 6 N. E.
(2d) 628 (1937); In re Behrend's Will, 227 Iowa 1099, 290 N. W. 78 (1940) (toxic
goiter, arteriosclerosis, Bright's Disease, splenitis, and cirrhosis of the liver, all of which
were of a progressive nature) ; Loving's Adm'r v. Williamson, 274 Ky. 571, 119 S. W.
(2d) 651 (1938) (cancer) ; Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938)
(heart leakage of 25 years duration) ; Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J. Eq. 211 (1884) (sequelac
of sunstroke and fall from second story window, also delirium tremens); Matter of
Forsyth, 169 Misc. 1042, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 642 (Surr. Ct. 1938) (hypertension, neuras-
thenia, arteriosclerosis, and a paralytic stroke) ; In re Morey's Will, 254 App. Div. 713,
4 N. Y. S. (2d) 125 (3d Dep't 1938) (kidney disease, diabetes, heart disease, and arterio-
sclerosis) ; it re Wood's Will, 253 App. Div. 78, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1268 (3d Dep't 1937)
(progressive arteriosclerosis and uremia); Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 115
S. W. (2d) 237 (1937) ; Oglesby v. Harris, 130 S. W. (2d) 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)
(arteriosclerosis, heart disease, and Bright's Disease) ; In re McCoy's Estate, 91 Utah
212, 63 P. (2d) 620 (1937) (in extremis) ; In re Landgren's Estate, 189 Wash. 33, 63 P.
(2d) 438 (1936) (high blood pressure, paralytic stroke, cerebral arteriosclerosis, cata-
ract, and senile dementia). See DAYTox, Naw FACTS oNi MENTAL DzsoDamis (1940)
63-66.
94. 94 U. S. 506 (1877).
95. Id. at 510.
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The evidentiary value of bodily infirmity and disease is well recog-
nized by the courts. Expert opinion should give them added significance.
Although there is some danger of simulation, they have the advantage of
being comparatively objective; and the courts seem to like this quality.
A few examples will illustrate the judicial tendency to rely upon this type
of evidence. Courts have recognized that a paralytic stroke frequently
produces mental derangement ;2o that the same is true of arteriosclerosis ;t
that psychotic conditions frequently follow certain diseases which produce
toxic conditions in the blood stream, such as uremia,"8 Bright's Disease,"
and toxic goiter ;"'o that any disease or injury, if severe enough, can cause
at least temporary mental incompetendy.' 01 The problem is primarily one
of interpretation for the expert medical witness, but courts sometimes
furnish their own interpretations when medical evidence is lackinga t '
The use of alcohol and drugs. There is authority for the proposition
that intoxication is an independent ground for avoiding an agreement 103
or invalidating a will."" Such statements are too broad. Intoxication per
se does not extinguish contractual capacity '05 or testamentary capacity. 210
The degree of intoxication, however, may have an important bearing upon
the question of mental incompetency. 10 7 Likewise, the fact that a person
96. See Allen v. Francis, 277 Ky. 20, 125 S. W. (2d) 211 (1939).
97. See In re Behrend's Will, 227 Iowa 1099, 290 N. W. 78 (1940) ; Oglesby v. Har-
ris, 130 S. V. (2d) 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
98. See In re Gill's Estate, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 526, 58 P. (2d) 734 (1936).
99. See Sulzberger v. Sulzberger, 372 Ill. 240, 23 N. E. (2d) 46 (1939). See also
Berryman v. Sidwell, 278 Ky. 713, 729-39, 129 S. V. (2d) 154, 162 (1939), in which
particular emphasis is laid on Bright's Disease as one disease "which, if its course runs
for any length of time, has a great tendency to weaken the mental faculties.'
100. See In re Behrend's Will, 227 Iowa 1099, 290 N. NV. 78 (1940).
101. Shell shock, for example, Beane v. Stroope, 200 Ark. 922, 141 S. V. (2d) 537
(1940); or severe fractures resulting from an accident, In re Patti's Estate, 133 Pa.
Super. 81, 1 A. (2d) 791 (1938) ; or traumatic hysteria, Carr v. Sacramento Clay Pro-
ducts Co., 35 Cal. App. 439, 170 Pac. 446 (1918).
102. See Beane v. Stroope, 200 Ark. 922, 141 S. W. (2d) 537 (1940); In re McCo)'s
Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P. (2d) 620 (1937).
103. For comprehensive annotations, see Notes (1920) 6 A. L It. 331, (1925) 36 A.
L. R. 619.
104. For a comprehensive annotation, see Note (1930) 67 A. L. I 857.
105. See Johnson v. Lane, 369 Ill. 135, 15 N. E. (2d) 710 (1938).
106. See Pierce v. Pierce, 38 Mich. 412 (1878); Kish v. Bakaysa, 330 Pa. 533, 199
AUt. 321 (1938).
107. See In re Gharky's Estate, 57 Cal. 274 (1831) (will case); Saliba .. James,
143 Fla. 404, 196 So. 832 (1940) (contract case) ; Swygart v. Willard, 166 Ind. 25, 76
N. E. 755 (1906) (will case) ; Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 24 N. E. 118 (1890)
(will case) ; Howe v. Richards. 112 Iowa 220, 83 N. IV. 909 (1900) (will case); Pierce
v. Pierce, 38 Mich. 412 (1878) (will case) ; Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J. Eq. 211 (1834) (will
case). Chronic alcoholism is considered a very prominent etiological factor in producing
mental disorder. A recent survey indicated that it is present in one-fifth of all patients
admitted to mental hospitals in Massachusetts. DAYToN, op. cit. supra note 93, c. 4.
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was under the influence of narcotic or hypnotic drugs possesses evidentiary
value on the issue of mental incompetency.108 The evidentiary value of
this element does not depend upon whether the drugs were administered
under the direction of a physician to alleviate pain and suffering during
an illness, 0' or whether they were self-administered by the party for his
own indulgence." 0 The use of alcohol and drugs may have a direct bear-
ing upon capacity to understand in two ways. In the first place, the im-
mediate physiological effect in large doses is to produce temporary but
pronounced mental disturbances, chiefly diminution of perception and
understanding, confusion, stupor, or delirium. In the second place, chronic
use of alcohol or drugs may produce definite psychoses."'
Illiteracy. The fact that the person executing the will or entering into
the agreement was illiterate 112 or had a poor understanding of the English
language is sometimes relied upon by the courts as one of several facts
to fortify a finding of mental incompetency.' 13 By itself illiteracy, like old
108. See McCartney v. Holmquist, 106 F .(2d) 855 (App. D. C. 1939) (will case,
"hypnotic and narcotic drugs") ; Whitsett v. Belue, 172 Ala. 256, 54 So. 677 (1911) (will
case, morphine, opium, and chloroform) ; Crescio v. Crescio, 365 Ill. 393, 6 N. E. (2d) 628
morphine) ; Boyd v. Boyd, 123 Ark. 134, 184 S. W. 838 (1916) (contract case, strych-
nine and caffeine) ; In re D'Avignon's Will, 12 Colo. App. 489, 55 Pac. 936 (1899) (will
case, morphine, opium, and chloroform) ; Chescio v. Crescio, 365 I1. 393, 6 N. E. (2d) 628
(1937) (will case, sodium bromide, and chloral hydrate) ; Smith v. Salthouse, 147 Kan.
354, 76 P. (2d) 836 (1938) (will case, "drugs and opiates") ; Loving's Adm'r v. Wil-
liamson, 274 Ky. 571, 119 S. W. (2d) 651 (1938) (will case, "hypnotic and narcotic
drugs"); Naylor v. McRuer, 248 Mo. 423, 154 S. W. 772 (1913) (will case, "narcotics
and morphine").
109. See McCartney v. Holmquist, 106 F. (2d) 855 (App. D. C. 1939); Boyd v.
Boyd, 123 Ark. 134, 184 S. W. 838 (1916) ; Stedham's Heirs v. Stedham's Ex'r, 32 Ala,
525 (1858) ; Crescio v. Crescio, 365 Ill. 393, 6 N. E. (2d) 628 (1937) ; Smith v. Salt-
house, 147 Kan. 354, 76 P. (2d) 836 (1938) ; Bliss v. Bahr, 161 Ore. 79, 87 P. (2d) 219
(1939) ; In re Patti's Estate, 133 Pa. Super. 81, 1 A. (2d) 791 (1938).
110. See Kellett v. Cochran, 239 Ala. 313, 194 So. 805 (1940) (will case, "liquor and
drugs") ; In re Gharky's Estate, 57 Cal. 274 (1881) (drunkenness) ; hM re D'Avignon's
Will, 12 Colo. App. 489, 55 Pac. 936 (1899) ; Rutland v. Gleaves and Thompson, 31 Tenn.
198 (1851) (will case, "opium and ardent spirits").
111. For symptoms, see pages 272-73 supra.
112. For a statistical study showing the relationship between illiteracy, education,
and mental disorder, see DAYTON, op. cit. su pra note 93, at 372-75. His figures show
that in Massachusetts the illiterate group in the population is 4 per cent, and in first
admissions to hospitals for mental disorders, it comprises 7.6 per cent of the cases. His
figures also show that in the illiterate group the psychoses occupying the first six posi-
tions are mental deficiency, senile dementia, alcoholic psychoses, psychoses with cerebral
arteriosclerosis, epileptic psychoses, and psychoses with cerebral syphilis.
113. Cases involving agreevtents: Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 (1877); Haw-
kins v. Randolph, 149 Ark. 124, 231 S. W. 556 (1921). Will Cases: In re Alexander's
Estate, 111 Cal. App. 1, 295 Pac. 53 (1931) ; Lehman v. Lindenmeyer, 48 Colo. 305, 109
Pac. 956 (1910). It is also considered a material evidentiary fact on the issue of fraud:
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age, has no probative value, for it does not necessarily indicate incapacity
for understanding. Yet it may be evidence that the intellectual capacity
of the individual was so low that he could not learn to read or write. At
least, it is often a concomitant of mental deficiency; and, certainly, it dues
place an individual under a handicap when dealing with his fellow mem-
bers of society.
MORAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSACTION AND ITS CONSE-QUENCES
The six facts comprising this group have probative value regarding the
moral aspects of the transaction, that is, whether it is a fair one and should
be supported, but they have only a negligible probative value upon the
articulate issue, capacity for understanding. The first five in this group
are the presence or absence of independent advice, a confidential or fidu-
ciary relationship, undue influence, fraud, and secrecy. The sixth, the ab-
normality of the transaction, is of controlling importance.
Presence or absence of indepcndent advice. The presence or absence of
independent advice is usually treated as retevant only to the question of
undue influence. The typical situation is one in which a dominant party
in a confidential relation deals with the other; and here the absence of
independent advice on the part of the subservient party raises a presump-
tion of undue influence." 4 In those cases where the issues of mental in-
competency and undue influence are both present, it would be perfectly
natural to expect this element to emerge into a place of some importance.
But it is also sometimes relied upon in cases where the court is considering
only the issue of mental incompetency. That it should be an element in
these cases seems justifiable. If it is the law's protective policy which
prompts courts to interfere in behalf of a mental incompetent," this im-
pulse should be quickened by the absence of any independent advice to
the incompetent. On the other hand, if the incompetent's interests are
guarded by a person who is able to give him protection and advice, the
law should be slower to intervene. A sampling of the cases indicates that
courts are placing considerable reliance upon this element when dealing
Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind. 236, 150 N. E. 361 (1926); Wilkie v. Sassen, 123 Iow.a 421, 99
N. NV. 124 (1904); on the issue of undue influence: Moore v. Home, 136 S. NV. (2d)
638 (Tem. Civ. App. 1940); on the combined issues of mental incompetency and fraud:
Sunseri v. Katz, 53 Ariz. 234, 87 P. (2d) 797 (1939); and on the combined issues of
mental incompetency, fraud, and undue influence: In re Patti's Estate, 133 Pa. Super.
81, 1 A. (2d) 791 (1938).
114. In some jurisdictions this presumption is held to be conclusive: Liles v. Terry,
[1895] 2 Q. B. 679; Slack v. Rees, 66 N. J. Eq. 447, 59 AtI. 466 (1904); but in the
majority, it is held to be rebuttable: Brown v. Canadian Co., 209 Cal. 596, 289 Pac. 613
(1930); Zimmerman v. Frushour, 108 Md. 115, 69 Atl. 796 (190S).
115. See Green, supra note 56, at 1205 et seq.
19441
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
with the single or combined issues of fraud, undue influence, and mental
incompetency. 16
A glance at the cases which stressed, or at least mentioned, the element
of lack of independent advice as a reason for granting relief to the in-
competent or his representatives is suggestive. Two are will cases in which
the chief legatee selected the attorney to draw the will.1 7 In another case
the court set aside a deed from an elderly woman to her daughter-in-law,
stressing the fact that a confidential relation existed and that the elderly
woman had no independent advice. The court considered this element
evidence both of mental incompetency and of undue influence. 1 In one
case where the issue involved was mental incompetency (from which the
court inferred fraud) and where no confidential relationship existed, the
court still stressed the fact of no independent advice as an element in justi-
fying the setting aside of a contract for the sale of land. 9 In another
case involving only mental incompetency, the court, setting aside a deed,
emphasized the fact that the grantee's lawyer was present and drew the
deed, and that the grantor had no independent advice. 20 In four of the
cases courts granting relief evidently considered this element persuasive
on the issue of mental incompetency, but rested their decision on the idea
of a "presumptive fraud" perpetrated upon the incompetent. 2 In the
remaining case the element, although influential, remained implicit. 2
In the cases in which the presence of independent advice was regarded
as an important element in sustaining the validity of the transaction, two
involved the three issues of mental incompetency, undue influence and
fraud;1" four involved the two issues of mental incompetency and undue
influence;..4 and five involved the single issue of mental incompetency. 12 1
1116. The sample consisted of a group of twenty-four cases from fifteen jurisdictions.
In thirteen cases, where relief was granted, the courts stressed the absence of independent
advice; in eleven cases, where relief was denied, the courts stressed the presence of
independent advice.
117. It re Gallo's Estate, 61 Cal. App. 163, 214 Pac. 496 (1923) (mental incompetency
and undue influence) ; James v. James, 64 Colo. 133, 170 Pac. 285 (1918) (mental incotn-
petency and undue influence).
118. Payne v. Payne, 12 Cal. App. 251, 107 Pac. 148 (1910) ; accord, Merritt v. East-
erly, 226 Iowa 514, 284 N. W. 397 (1939).
119. Wilkie v. Sassen, 123 Iowa 421, 99 N. W. 124 (1904).
120. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 (1877) (although there was no fiduciary or con-
fidential relationship here, the court intimates that imposition or undue influence might
be inferred) ; accord, Griffin v. Mays, 183 Okla. 350, 82 P. (2d) 836 (1938).
121. Klose v. Hillenbrand, 88 Cal. 473, 26 Phc. 352 (1891) ; Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind.
236, 150 N. E. 361 (1926); Mettetal v. Hall, 288 Mich. 200, 284 N. W. 698 (1939);
Stieber v. Vanderlip, 136 Neb. 862, 287 N, W. 773 (1939).
122. Jones v. Travers, 116 Ark. 95, 172 S. W. 828 (1915).
123. Perry v. Pearson, 1 5 Ill. 218, 25 N. E. 636 (1890) ; Travis v. McCully, 186 Okla.
378, 98 P. (2d) 595 (1940).
124. Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 198 Pac. 712 (1921) ; Nessen v. Nessen, 218 Cal.
59, 21 P. (2d) 415 (1933); Borovansky v. Para, 306 Ill. App. 60, 28 N. E. (2d) 174
(1940); Wood v. Moss, 176 Ky. 419, 195 S. W. 1077 (1917).
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In five of the cases the independent advice was given by a lawyer of the
party's own selection ;2 in one, by the cashier of a bank ;' in one, by the
party's wife." s In another case the party was himself a law~yer, but had
also consulted lifelong friends.1 29 In still another the advice was given
by a person who had been attending to the party's business affairs for
fifteen years ;13o in another case, by a notary public ;,-" and in the last, the
grantee took the precaution of having the grantor examined by two doc-
tors and had him consult a lawyer.'
Cases involving the single issue of mental incompetency in which the
element of independent advice has been considered are relatively rare. In
most of the opinions, it is impossible to tell from the court's statement of
the facts whether or not there was anything in the evidence concerning
the presence or absence of independent advice. That the record was silent
is probable in view of the fact that this element seems to be potent when
it is definitely present in a case. Perhaps if its importance were realized
by trial counsel, it would appear more frequently.'3
125. Beale v. Gibaud, 15 F. Supp. 1020 (IV. D. N. Y. 1936); Bordner v. Kelso, 293
I1. 175, 127 N. E. 337 (1920); Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 128 MicI. 110, 87 N. NV. 81
(1901); Hill v. Day, 34 N. J. Eq. 150 (1881); 'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y.
541 (1880).
126. Beale v. Gibaud, 15 F. Supp. 1020 (NV. D. N. Y. 1936); Nessen v. Nessen, 218
Cal. 59, 21 P. (2d) 415 (1933) ; Borovansky v. Para, 306 111. App. 60, 28 N. E. (2d)
174 (1940) ; Perry v. Pearson, 135 Ill. 218, 25 N. E. 636 (1890) ; 'utual Life Ins. Co.
v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541 (1880).
127. Bordner v. Kelso, 293 Ill. 175, 127 N. E. 337 (1920).
128. Hill v. Day, 34 N. J. Eq. 150 (1881).
129. Wood v. Moss, 176 Ky. 419, 195 S. V. 1077 (1917).
130. Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 198 Pac. 712 (1921).
131. Travis v. McCully, 186 Okla. 378, 98 P. (2d) 595 (1940).
132. Ramsdell v. Ramsd.ell, 128 Mich. 110, 87 N. V. 81 (1901). This case suggests
the question of what measures can be taken at the time of the transaction to forestall
future litigation. A psychiatric examination at the time of the transaction with a pro-
nouncement of competency should be strong evidence in any later contest. Judicial dis-
trust for such expert opinion might, however, still remain. In the case of deeds and con-
tracts a declaratory judgment is a possibility. In the case of wills, ante morten probate
has been suggested, although this is not possible under the usual probate machinery. The
problem is discussed in 7 WIGmORE, Evmmca, § 1933; Cavers, Ante .1forlem Proba*:
an Essay in Pre'entize Laut (1934) 1 U. or Cur. L. REv. 440; Stephens, Probate Psy-
chiatr y-Exa nz ation of Testamentary Capacity by a Psychiatrist as a Subscribing Wit-
ness (1930) 25 ILL L. Rnv. 276; Sulbert, Probate PsychiatrY.-a Ncuro-Psychiafric
Examination of Testator from the Psychiatric Vie-wpoint (1930) 25 La. L. REv. 283.
133. If the "understanding test" required for competency a full understanding of the
particular transaction under the particular circumstances of the case-an understanding,
not merely that a deed transferred title, but also of the relative economic advantages
involved-then the pertinence of the presence or absence of independent advice would he
clear. A weak minded grantor might understand a transaction, if all of its ramifications
were explained to him by an unbiased independent advisor, but not be able to understand
it without such help. See Mettetal v. Hall, 288 'Mich. 200, 284 N. NV. 698 (1939). There
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Presence or absence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship. A large
percentage of cases which set aside transactions on the ground of undue
influence hold a confidential or fiduciary relationship to be a prerequisite
to invalidation.' Hence, in those cases, the presence of a confidential
or fiduciary relationship is not only pertinent but essential. It may also
be important on the issue of fraud. Actually, a confidential or fiduciary
relationship as such has no logical relevance to the issue of mental in-
competency.
When a court is considering the issue of mental incompetency coupled
with the issue of fraud or undue influence, and when it attaches evidential
importance to the presence or absence of a confidential or fiduciary re-
lationship, it is easy to explain this element as bearing only upon the issue
to which it is logically relevant."; However, there still remain a number
of cases which attach importance to it as relevant to the single issue of
mental incompetency.".
is no itmiform understanding test, however. Some courts require a very low degree of
understanding, merely an appreciation of the fact that this paper is a deed, while others
require also an understanding of consequences. Even within the same jurisdiction the
standard is very apt to be subject to constant change. See Green, supra note 16.
134. Under the Restatement definition of undue influence, it can exist only when one
party is under the domination of the other. RESTATEME,%tNT, CONTRACTs (1932) § 497. This
usually occurs when there is a confidential or fiduciary relation between the parties. Sep
5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs, 4539; 1 PAGE, WILLS, 348 et seq.; I SHOULER, WILLS (6th ed.)
319; r PAGE, CO NTmAcrs, 739; (1941) 41 CoL. L. REV. 707-23.
135. The following cases which stress the presence or absence of a confidential rela-
tion as an important circumstance may be explained upon this basis. Cases hnvolvhng
agreements: Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42, 188 So. 867 (1939) ; (mental incompetency and
undue influence) ; Sunseri v. Katz, 53 Ariz. 234, 87 P. (2d) 797 (1939) (mental incom-
petency and fraud); Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind. 236, 150 N. E. 361 (1926) (mental incom-
petency and fraud); Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 284 N. W. 397 (1939) (mental
incompetency and undue influence); Rounds v. Rounds, 220 Ky. 98, 294 S. W. 785
(1927) (mental incompetency and undue influence); Mead v. Gilbert, 170 Md. 592, 185
Atl. 668 (1936) (mental incompetency and fraud) ; Clement v. Smith, 293 Mich. 393, 292
N. W. 343 (1940) (mental incompetency and undue influence); Raynett v. Baluss, 54
Mich. 469 (1884) (mental incompetency and fraud) ; Stieber v. Vanderlip, 136 Neb. 862,
287 N. W. 773 (1939) (mental incompetency and fraud) ; Parker v. Parker, 75 Okla. 234,
182 Pac. 697 (1919) (mental incompetency and undue influence) ; Bliss v. Bahr, 161 Ore.
79, 87 P. (2d) 219 (1939) (mental incompetency and undue influence). Will cases: It re
Johnson's Estate, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 251, 87 P. (2d) 900 (1939) (mental incompetency
and undue influence) ; In re Gallo's Estate, 61 Cal. App. 163, 214 Pac. 496 (1923) (men-
tal incompetency and undue influence) ; James v. James, 64 Colo. 133, 170 Pac. 285 (1918)
(mental incompetency and undue influence) ; Gorman v. Hickey, 145 Kan. 54, 64 P. (2d)
587 (1937) (mental incompetency and undue influence); In re Patti's Estate, 133 Pa.
Super. 81, 1 A. (2d) 791 (1938) (mental incompetency, fraud, and undue influence) ;
Moore v. Home, 136 S. W. (2d) 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (mental incompetency and
undue influence) ; Dean v. Jordan, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P. (2d) 331 (1938) (mental incom-
petency, fraud, and undue influence).
136. The following are typical. Cases involhing agreements: Hawkins v. Randolph,
149 Ark. 124, 231 S. W. 556 (1921); Payne v. Payne, 12 Cal. App. 251, 107 Pac. 148
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If we accept the articulate standard of the courts and the test is merely
the capacity of the individual to understand, these cases are wrong. Only
on the assumption that the court is employing an inarticulate standard
and is judging the transaction and not the individual alone, can the cases
be supported.
Presence or absence of undue influcuec. Undue influence and mental
incompetency are so frequently associated as joint grounds for attacking
a transaction, especially in will contests, that they have been called the
Gold Dust Twins. They are customarily considered separate invalidating
agencies. Mental weakness may, however, be an important evidentiary
fact in the proof of undue influence; and some courts have held that
undue influence may be an evidentiary fact in the proof of mental incom-
petency.13 7 In support of this position it may be argued that all behavior
has some bearing on the issue of mental incompetency. All abnormal or
irrational conduct is some evidence of incompetency. It may be argued
that it is not abnormal to succumb to permissible influence, but that it is
abnormal to succumb to undue influence, which overpowers the will and
substitutes therefor the will of another.
Presence or absence of fraud. What has been said of undue influence
may, with slight mnodification, also be said of fraud. Mental wealkness
has bearing upon the reliance aspect of fraud. One of imperfect under-
standing is more likely to be deceived by misrepresentations. Likewise,
reliance in a particular case may be an abnormal act and as such is some
evidence of mental incompetency. 3
Presence or absence of secrecy. A donee may keep secret the fact that
a gift has been made to him. Or if a testator has advised him that he is
making a will in his favor, the putative legatee may keep the fact a secret
from other natural objects of the testator's bounty. Similarly, a party to
a business transaction may keep its e-istence secret. Does such secrecy
have any evidentiary value upon the question of the mental competency
of the donor, testator, or other party to the business transaction?
Secrecy is a badge of fraud.'3" It may also be a badge of undue in-
fluence, which some courts regard as a species of fraud. From a medical
viewpoint secrecy together with other symptoms may indicate certain
(1910); Thatcher v. Kramer, 347 IlL 601, 1SO N. E. 434 (1932) ; Beattie v. Bower, 290
Afich. 517, 287 N. W. 900 (1939) ; Taylor v. Martin, 125 X. J. Eq. 156, 4 A. (2d) 690
(1939); Griffin v. 'Mays, 183 Okla. 350, 82 P. (2d) 836 (1938). Iill Case: Pusey's
Estate, 321 Pa. 248, 184 Atl. 844 (1936).
137. The cases supporting this proposition are collected and analyzed in Green, supra
note 40.
138. Ibid.
139. For an early statement to this effect, see Twyne's Case (1602), 3 Coke, SOb;
see also Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. 337, 398 (C. C. D. Cal. 1M5).
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mental disorders, but they are not typically those which constitute mental
incompetency. From a legal standpoint, it is difficult to see how secrecy
surrounding the transaction could have probative value to show mental
incompetency. 140 But because of the frequency with which this issue is
combined with the issues of fraud and undue influence, and because of
the tendency of courts to lump fractional grounds to spell out a whole
ground of invalidity,141 we sometimes find courts apparently regarding the
secrecy of the transaction as significant evidence of mental incompetency.
"Enfeebled mentality, secrecy and self-interest," the Oregon Supreme
Court has said, "are three dangerous guests to be present together at the
making of a will." 142 Both in regard to agreements 143 and wills 144
a few scattered cases seem to regard the secrecy of the transaction or
the absence of secrecy, as relevant to the issue of mental incompetency.
Abnormality of the transaction in question. When the validity of a
particular transaction has been challenged and is being scrutinized by a
court, one of the first things to be noted is whether or not the transaction
140. There is a line of authority holding that where a contract is executed, wholly
or partially, it may not be avoided on the ground of mental incompetency unless the other
party knew of the mental disorder. For the leading English case, see Molton v. Camroux,
2 Ex. 487,154 Eng. Rep. R. 584 (1848), 4 Ex. 17,154 Eng. Rep. R. 1107 (1'849). For repre-
sentative American cases adopting this position, see Beale v. Gibaud, 15 F. Supp. 1020 (W.
D. N. Y. 1936); First Nat. Bank v. Sarvey, 198 Iowa 1067, 198 N. W. 496 (1924);
Shoulters v. Allen, 51 Mich. 529, 16 N. W. 888 (1883) ; Groff v. Stitzer, 77 N. J. Eq.
260, 77 Atl. 46 (1910) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541 (1880) ; Searcy v,
Hammett, 202 N. C. 42, 161 S. E. 733 (1932). In such jurisdictions secrecy surrounding
the transaction might give rise to an inference that the other party knew of the mental
disorder.
141. The process by which courts permit a partial showing of fraud or undue influ-
ence to be added to a partial showing of mental incompetency, so 0is to result in a com-
posite ground for avoiding the transaction is discussed in Green, supra note 40. For rep-
resentative cases in which this process is manifest, see Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506
(1877) (partial undue influence plus partial mental incompetency); Sunseri v. Katz, 53
Ariz. 234, 87 P. (2d) 797 (1939) (partial fraud plus partial mental incompetency);
Beane v. Stroope, 200 Ark. 922, 141 S. W. (2d) 537 (1940) (partial fraud plus partial
mental incompetency); Sulzberger v. Sulzberger, 372 Ill. 240, 23 N. E. (2d) 46 (1939)
(partial undue influence plus partial mental incompetency); Herzog v. Gipson, 170 Ky.
325, 185 S. W. 1119 (1916) (partial undue influence plus partial mental incompetency).
142. In re Johnson's Estate, 162 Ore. 97, 132, 91 P. (2d) 330, 343 (1939), (quoting
from the earlier case of King v. Tonsing, 87 Ore. 236, 238, 170 Pac. 319, 320 (1918)].
In the principal case a will was disallowed because of lack of testamentary capacity and
undue influence. The appellate court affirmed on the ground of incapacity alone. On that
issue, however, it did appear to attach significance to the secrecy of the transaction.
143. See Nessen v. Nessen, 218 Cal. 59, 21 P. (2d) 415 (1933) (absence of secrecy
stressed) ; Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 284 N. W. 397 (1939) ; Wilkie v. Sassen,
123 Iowa 421, 99 N. W. 124 (1904).
144. See In re Hansen's Estate, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 99, 100 P. (2d) 776 (1940) ; In re
Gallo's Estate, 61 Cal. App. 163, 214 Pac. 496 (1923) ; In re Johnson's Estate, 162 Ore, 97,
91 P. (2d) 330 (1939).
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conforms to the normal pattern of similar transactions. If it does con-
form to the normal and usual pattern, this fact in and of itself is evidence
of no small value that the challenge is without merit. If it does not con-
form, a suspicion immediately is aroused that there may be something
wrong with the transaction and that the challenge may have merit. If
the nonconformity is sufficiently pronounced, this fact, in and of itself,
is evidence of substantial value that the challenge is meritorious. While
these observations may be overly broad as applied to law in general, they
are accurate statements when applied to the law of mental incompetency.
Before the cases are examined it is necessary to define what is meant
by the "normal pattern" of similar transactions and to indicate the source
of the standard for determining what is normal. The mores of the com-
munity furnish much of the raw Material from which rules of law are
made. They are the source of the institutional patterns of normal trans-
actions. The mores of the community are to be found in the customs,
folkvays, established collective habits,", 5 and the collective value judg-
ments of persons of good character in the community.1 40 There are cer-
tain rather well-defined attitudes upon the part of people generally in the
United States in regard to the way in which a person should dispose of
his property by gift and the way in which he should deal with his fellow
men in a business transaction. These are general, not universal attitudes;
and while there will be room for individual differences of opinion in con-
crete cases, these broad attitudes may be used as a norm in a general way,
although, like general "rules of law," they will not serve to decide cases
automatically.
In examining the abnormality of the transaction as an evidentiary fact
it will be convenient to lump together inter vivos and testamentary gifts
and consider them separately from business transactions. "Freedom of
gift is one of the incidents of property in English law, yet it has not been
won without a struggle and its extension has been criticized." 14" The
mores of the United States approve of work, condemn idleness, and look
askance at unearned gain; "14 they believe that the first duty of the head
of a house is to provide for his family, that "charity begins at home."
While they approve of voluntary gifts for public purposes where the
donor is in a position to make them, improvidence is something to be
condemned. Gratitude is one of the virtues, and a reward based upon
merit is always commendable. These, by and large, are the public attitudes
by which the judge on the bench, in common with the jurors in the box
145. DEwY, HUmANx NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922) 75.
146. Tufts, The Moral Life md the Construction of Values and Standards in CEATI%,E
INTELLiGEcE-ESsAYs IN THE PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE (1917) 382.
147. Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life (1918) 18 COL. L. Rwv. 381, 387.
148. Tumrs, AmumcA's SOCIAL MoRAtrIY (1933) 38; Patterson, supra note 147, at
386 et seq.
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and the layman in the world outside, judge the normality or abnormality
of the transaction.
When a parent desires to make a gift to one or more of his children,
there is no law which requires him to treat them equally, and there are
dicta to the effect that an unequal distribution is not evidence of mental in-
competency. 149 But the public mores regard equality in the treatment of
children as desirable unless reasons exist for unequal treatment. They
would not condemn a father for having a favorite child, but in the absence
of some apparent reason, they would brand a gross discrimination as un-
natural. Thus, where a decedent deeded all of his property to one son
to the exclusion of his wife and other children, and there was no apparent
reason for the discrimination, the unnaturalness of the gift fortified the
court's conclusion that the act was the product of an insane delusion.150
This gift ran counter to a general belief in equality of treatment and a
belief that the first duty of the head of the house is to provide for the
entire family. In another case,' a father gave practically all of his prop-
erty to one son to the exclusion of his other children, who sued to set
aside the transfers after their father's death. The lower court dismissed
the bill. The appellate court was "more or less astonished" at the action
of the trial court and reversed with instructions to award relief to the
plaintiffs. There was other evidence of mental incompetency, and it was
further shown that the defendant was in a much better financial position
than the plaintiff. The court remarked:
"The record is absolutely barren of any fact upon which either
of the transactions could be logically based, as supported by reason
therefor, much less with fairness to the other heirs." 152
Vhile the fact that the gift was an extremely improvident one will be
considered important evidence upon the issue of mental incompetency,153
an apparently unnatural transaction may, however, be explained. In one
case 154 a mother had deeded all of her property to one son to the ex-
clusion of her other children, and the deed was attacked upon the ground
of the grantor's mental incompetency. The court said the "unnaturalness"
of the transaction had weight, but that, in view of the small value of the
mother's property and the fact that the defendant had supported her, the
gift "may with as much reason indicate that she [the deceased grantor]
149. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lane, 369 Ill. 135, 15 N. E. (2d) 710 (1938).
150. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 360 Il1. 101, 195 N. E. 521 (1935).
151. Allen v. Francis, 277 Ky. 20, 125 S. W. (2d) 211 (1939).
152. Id. at 22, 125 S. W. (2d) at 212.
153. See Taylor v. Martin, 125 N. J. Eq. 156, 4 A. (2d) 690 (1939) (aged and ill mother
making gift to daughter, resulting in impoverishment of former) ; Wigley v. Buzzard,
124 S. W. (2d) 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (aged and infirm mother, discriminating
against other children, gave valuable oil land to one son).
154. Travis v. Travis, 81 Fla. 309, 87 So. 762 (1921).
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was grateful for what had been done." ' Similar observations apply to
gifts made from a husband to his wife, " or from a son to his father,51
or to a total stranger.15s
It is true that courts often say that there is no duty upon the part of a
testator to make an equal division of his estate among the natural objects
of his bounty,' and that no inference of mental incompetency can be
drawn from the fact of unnatural testamentary dispositionsCo° It is also
true that the circumstances may show that an unequal distribution is not
an unnatural distribution.' Nevertheless. whether or not the will was
an unnatural one under the circumstances of the case is treated as an im-
portant evidentiary fact upon the issue of mental incompetency."' 2
Where a testator passes over the natural objects of his bounty and
gives his property to others, courts very frequently characterize such con-
duct as "unnatural," "harsh," "unjust," or "irrational" and treat it as
strong corroborative evidence of lack of testamentary capacity.103 On
155. Id. at 318, 87 So. at 765.
156. See Revlett v. Revlett, 274 Ky. 176, 118 S. W. (2d) 150 (1938) (gifts held liat-
ural under the circumstances) ; Beattie v. Bower, 290 Mich. 517, 287 N. W. 9do (1939)
(improvident and unnatural character of the gift, with ,,ther evidence 04f mental inc,,m-
petency, caused appellate court to reverse with directions to set aside the convevances);
Travis v. McCully, 186 Okla. 378, 98 P. (2d) 595 (1940) (conveyance held natural
under the circumstances).
157. See Parker v. Parker. 75 Okla. 234, 182 Pac. 697 (1919) (holding deed in'alid
on combined grounds of mental incompetency and undue influence).
"158. In Rondous v. Erb, 176 MId. 694, 4 A. (2d) 4f,8 (1939), the unnaturalnes!s of the
transaction constituted an additional reason for invalidating it. In the follnwing cases
the naturalness of the transaction under the circumstances was important in causing the
court to sustain it: Field v. Shorb, 99 Cal, 661, 34 Pac. 504 (1893) ; Kirk v. Tac:ett,
134 Neb. 759, 279 N. W. 468 (1938); McFarland v. Ellingswi.rth, 159 Ore. 446, SO P.
(2d) 899 (1938).
159. See In re McCabe's Will, 75 fisc. 35, 134 N. Y. Supp. 61,2 (Surr. Ct. 1911);
In re Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 132 Ad. 786 (1926).
160. See Kish v. Bakaysa, 330 Pa. 533. 199 AtI. 321 (138).
161. See Councill v. Mayhew, 172 Ala. 295, 55 So. 314 (1911) ; In re Sexton's Estate,
199 Cal. 759, 251 Pac. 778 (1926).
162. See Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 57 S. E. 69 (1907); Maher v. Maher, 338
Ill. 102, 170 N. E. 221 (1930) ; Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 24 N. E. 113 (1890) ;
In re Bose's Estate, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N. W. 319 (1939); In re Wood's Will, 253 App.
Div. 78, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1268 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 637,
115 S. W. (2d) 1937. See also Whitehead v. Malcom, 161 Ga. 55, 129 S. EM 769 (1925).
163. See In re XVasserman's Estate, 170 Cal. 101, 148 Pac. 931 (1915); In re Ale.x-
ander's Estate, 111 Cal. App. 1, 295 Pac. 53 (1931); Lehman v. Lindenmeyer, 43 Colo.
305, 109 Pac. 956 (1910) ; Swygart v. Villard, 166 Ind. 25, 76 N. F. 755 (1905) ; Howe
v. Richards, 112 Iowa 220, 83 N. W. 909 (1900) ; Osborn v. Paul, 272 Ky. 694, 114 S. W.
(2d) 1134 (1938) ; Proffer v. Proffer, 342 M o. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938) ; In re
Cissel's Estate, 104 Mont. 306, 66 P. (2d) 779 (1937) ; Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J. Eq. 211
(1884); It re Morey's Will, 254 App. Div. 713, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 125 (3d Dept 1938);
In re Kenney's Will, 179 App. Div. 258, 166 N. Y. Supp. 478 (2d Dep't 1917) ; It re Red-
ding's Will, 216 N. C. 497, 5 S. E. (2d) 544 (1939).
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the other hand, if a testator does properly provide for the natural objects
of his bounty, or if his will is "reasonable" and "just" under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, courts often regard this as strong evi-
dence of testamentary capacity. 1
64
There is a strong public policy to protect the family as a social insti-
tution.'65 It is reflected in the common law institutions of dower and
curtesy, and in legislative limitations upon the portion of his estate which
a testator may bequeath to strangers. It is also reflected in statutes of
descent and distribution prescribing how a person's property shall be dis-
tributed if he dies intestate. But a testator is given considerable leeway.
The "natural objects of his bounty" are not synonymous with his heirs
in case he dies intestate. He is comparatively free, but the same mores
which would condemn an inter vivos gift as unnatural apply to a testa-
mentary gift. The terms of the will itself are evidence of competency
or incompetency, as the case may be. If they accord with the mores, they
are evidence of competency; if they run counter to the mores, they are
some evidence of incompetency.'0 But to be really significant, the terms
164. See In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal. (2d) 573, 107 P. (2d) 25 (1940) ; In re Baci-
galupi's Estate, 202 Cal. 450, 261 Pac. 470 (1927) ; In re Sexton's Estate, 199 Cal. 759,
251 Pac. 778 (1926) ; it re Hayes' Estate, 55 Colo. 340, 135 Pac. 449 (1913) ; In re
Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo. 578, 85 Pac. 688 (1906) ; Jackson's Ex'r v. Semones, 266 Ky.
352, 98 S. W. (2d) 505 (1936) ;, Trimbo v. Trimbo, 47 Minn. 389, 50 N. W. 350 (1891)
(case involving a deed, made in lieu of a will, which the court said took the place of a
will and should, therefore, be judged according to testamentary standards) ; In re Ma-
son's Estate, 185 Okla. 278, 91 P. (2d) 657 (1939).
165. See Green, supra note 56.
166. See In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal. (2d) 573, 589, 107 P. (2d) 25, 33 (1940),
in which the court quoting from the superior court's opinion stated: "The will is a per-
fectly natural will and bears no evidence upon its face of any mental weakness of the tes-
tator, much less anything amounting to mental incapacity in the legal sense. On the con-
trary, it is convincing evidence of his testamentary capacity. . . ."; Davis v. Davis,
64 Colo. 62, 170 Pac. 208 (1918) (holding that the unnaturalness of the will may be
considered by the jury as evidence of incompetency and undue influence, although the
jury must not substitute its judgment of fairness for that of testator) ; Appeal of Cran-
dall, 63 Conn. 365, 28 Atl. 531 (1893) (on appeal by proponents, court affirmed the denial
of the proponents' requested instruction that jury might not consider the equity or in-
equity of the terms of the will) ; Whitehead v. Malcom, 161 Ga. 55, 129 S. E. 769 (1925)
(holding that the court may properly instruct jury that the reasonableness or unreason-
ableness of the disposition made by the will is relevant evidence on the question of incom-
petency) ; Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 24 N. E. 118 (1890) ; Berryman v. Sidwell,
278 Ky. 713, 129 S. W. (2d) 154 (1939) (holding that it was proper to read the will in
evidence on the issues of mental incompetency and undue influence) ; Jackson's Ex'r v.
Semones, 266 Ky. 352, 98 S. W. (2d) 505 (1936) (stating that if a will is rational on its
face, it is often the best evidence of competency) ; In re Cissel's Estate, 104 Mont. 306,
66 P. (2d) 779 (1937) (stating that unjustness of the will is one of the controlling con-
siderations) ; In re Bose's Estate, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N. W. 319 (1939) (holding that the
terms of the will are evidence on the question of testamentary capacity) ; Its re Wood's
Will, 253 App. Div. 78, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1268 (3d Dep't 1937) (the terms of the will are
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of the will must be viewed in relation to the position which the testator
occupied toward the natural objects of his bounty and the devisees and
legatees in the will. The will should be read in the light of his whole
social environment, and thus it is proper to introduce evidence to show
the friendly or unfriendly relations between him and the devisees and
legatees and between him and the natural objects of his bounty, the rela-
tive pecuniary condition of all parties concerned, the size, value, and source
of the estate, favors bestowed and services rendered by legatees, etc.1c0
The mores of the business transaction are simpler than the mores of
the gift. They are merely this, that one should not try to overreach his
neighb6rs, friends, and business associates.es Making allowances for
speculative ventures, a bargain should represent a fair exchange. But this
idea has not become crystallized into a rule of law requiring equivalent
considerations. On the contrary, if any rule of Anglo-American con-
tract law can be considered settled, it is that the law will not inquire into
the adequacy of consideration."'o The basis of this rule may be the fact
"important evidence" on the issue of testamentary capacity) ; In re Mascin's Estate, 185
Okla. 278, 91 P. (2d) 657 (1939) (a "rational" will is evidence of testamentary capacity) ;
MNelody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 637, 115 S. W. (2d) 237 (1937) (the will itself may
be looked to as evidence of sanity or insanity).
167. See Fountain v. Brown, 38 Ala. 72 (1861) (the state of testator's family rela-
tions, the pecuniary condition of legatees, etc.) ; Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555 (1859)
(pecuniary condition of testator's heirs at law). In In re Sexton's Estate, 199 Cal. 759,
773, 251 Pac. 778, 783 (1926), the testatrix willed her property to her six children, share
and share alike. The husband contested. The court noted that the will was just and equit-
able "in the light of the fact that contestant . . . [vas] a man of affluence." See also In
re Gallo's Estate, 61 Cal. App. 163, 214 Pac. 496 (1923) (poverty of son and daughter
who contest will) ; In re Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo. 578, 85 Pac. 688 (1906) (testator's
situation in life) ; Barbour v. Moore, 10 App. D. C. 30 (1897) (the situation in life and
pecuniary condition of the natural objects of testat.r's bountv, poverty-stricken grand-
children) ; Galloway v. Hogg, 167 Ga. 502, 146 S. E. 156 (1928) (the family relations
of testatrix) ; 'Maher v. Maher, 338 I1. 102, 170 N. E. 221 (1930) (family relations, facts
to explain inequalities of distribution, source and extent of estate, financial conditions of
relatives, and advancements made to them) ; Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N. E.
417 (1917), 119 N. E. 716 (1918) (the amount, situation, condition, and value of testator's
property; the number and names of the natural objects of his bounty; the conduct of
such persons toward testator, and his treatment of them, and the relations existing bet,'een
them); Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 24 N. E. 118 (1890) (evidence of the kind
and quality of labor performed for testator by contestants and their conduct toward him) ;
Howe v. Richards, 112 Iowa 220, 8M N. NV. 909 (1900) (evidence of friendly relations
between testator and contestants); In re Bose's Estate, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N. V. 319
(1939) ("contemporaneous circumstances and conditions"); Guarantee Trust Co. v.
Heidenreich, 290 Pa. 249, 138 Atl 764 (1927) (advancements made to contestants dur-
ing testator's lifetime) ; In re Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 132 AtL 786 (1926) (that
court should put itself in testator's shoes and environment) ; cf. Laube, The Right of a
Testator to Pauperize His Helpless Dependents (1928) 13 Co=n. L Q. 559, 569.
168. Turts, Ammc&'s SocAL MoRALrry (1933) 349.
169. 2 STET, FOUNDATIONS Or LEIAL Litnay (1906) 69; REsTAmIE~NT, CoN-
TRAcrs (1932) § 8f.
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that, while in normal situations the parties are exchanging equivalent
considerations, the law is not very well equipped to measure exact equiva-
lents in each case; and it, therefore, abandons the task and allows the
parties to determine for themselves what is a fair exchange.170 In the
normal situation there is a rough equivalency of exchange in the contract
obligations of the parties. It is only in the abnormal or atypical case that
there is a gross inadequacy of consideration. But such inadequacy is per
se legally inconsequential. However, when it is coupled with a charge of
fraud, undue influence, or mental incompetency, the picture immediately
changes. Inadequacy of consideration, then, takes on significance: it be.
comes an important element to be considered.
Where only the issue of mental incompetency is presented in the case,
inadequacy of consideration may have effect in three ways. The court
may consider it as evidence of incompetency."' The court may say that
neither mere mental weakness nor mere inadequacy of consideration is by
itself sufficient to avoid the contract, but together they constitute con-
structive fraud and ground relief. 2 Or the court may say that, granting
mental incompetency existed, inadequacy of consideration is the factor
which moves the court to grant relief.'7 3 Where the issue of mental in-
competency is coupled with fraud,'74 or with undue influence,' or with
both fraud and undue influence, 17 inadequacy of consideration is also a
potent element tending toward the granting of relief. And, conversely,
where it is a debatable question whether or not the mental weakness of
a party is sufficient to produce legal incompetency, a showing that the con-
170. Cohen, The Basis of Contract (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 581.
171. Kilgore v. Cross, 1 Fed. 578 (C. C. E. D. Ark. 1880); Campbell v. Lux, 146 Ark.
397, 225 S. W. 653 (1920); Thatcher v. Kramer, 347 111. 601, 180 N. E. 434 (1932);
Furry v. Bartling, 94 N. W. 471 (Iowa 1903).
172. Douglas v. Ogle, 80 Fla. 42, 85 So. 243 (1920) ; Seerley v. Sater, 68 Iowa 375,
27 N. W. 262 (1886) ; Raynett v. Baluss, 54 Mich. 469 (1884) ; Tindel v. Williams, 187
Okla. 482, 103 P. (2d) 551 (1940) ; Miller v. Sterringer, 66 W. Va. 169, 66 S. E. 228
(1909). See Seeman v. Hilderbrand, 195 Ark. 677, 113 S. W. (2d) 724 (1938).
173. McEvoy v. Tucker, 115 Ark. 430, 437, 171 S. W. 888, 891' (1914), in which the
court said, ". . . if, in addition to mental incapacity, there is also inadequacy of considera-
tion, equity will the more readily intervene to set aside a conveyance." To the effect that
mere mental incompetency, even though clearly proved, will not justify equitable relief
where the contract is fair and the consideration is adequate, see the rather remarkable case
of Clay v. Clay's Committee, 179 Ky. 494, 200 S. W. 934 (1918).
174. Kendall v. Ewert, 259 U. S. 139 (1922); Richey v. Crabtree, 198 Ark. 25, 127
S. W. (2d) 269 (1939) ; Wilkie v. Sassen, 123 Iowa 421, 99 N. W. 124 (1904) ; Mettetal
v. Hall, 288 Mich. 200, 284 N. W. 698 (1939).
175. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 (1877) ; Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42, 188 So. 867
(1939) ; Clement v. Smith, 293 Mich. 393, 292 N. W. 343 (1940).
176. Carr v. Sacramento Clay Products Co., 35 Cal. App. 439, 170 Pac. 446 (1918)
Harlow v. Kingston, 169 Wis. 521, 173 N. W. 308 (1919).
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tract was fair and the consideration adequate often will result in the con-
tract being upheld.177
The abnormality of the transaction is a proper element to be considered
in determining the issue of mental incompetency for two reasons. In the
first place, it accords with the basic policy of the law to protect the mental
incompetent and his dependents.17' And in the second place, if the trans-
action in itself is irrational, it is evidence of a disordered mind, as is any
other item of irrational behavior.
A possible objection may be raised in respect to the latter of these two
reasons. It may be argued that to judge the rationality of the person who
makes the contract or will by the rationality of the instrument he draws
may overlook the fact that the person making the contract or will may
have secret reasons which would justify his act, such as providing in his
will for an unknowledged illegitimate child, or that lie may have dif-
ferent standards of value from the court or jury which is subsequently
passing judgment upon him. While it is true that an external standard
is being imposed, in such a way as to restrict individual freedom, this
is no innovation in law. Instances of the same process could no doubt
be multiplied; but confining ourselves to the field of contracts and
wills, we find ample authority for imposing such external standards.
The objective theory of contracts no doubt restricts individual free-
dom, but it finds its social justification in protecting the reasonably
aroused expectations of the promisee. The indirect sanction of illegality
which courts apply in refusing to enforce certain contracts obviously re-
stricts individual freedom. So does the disability of infancy. In the field
of wills we find individual freedom restricted by the common law devices
of dower and curtesy and the statutory provisions which forbid a testator
to leave less than a specified percentage of his estate to his surviving
spouse 79 In large measure, men are judged by law and by society ac-
cording to society's standards, by their observable behavior and not by
their secret mental processes and motives, no matter how noble or how
base. It should be borne in mind that the abnormality of the transaction
is viewed in the light of the social environment of the party making the
177. Beale v. Gibaud, 15 F. Supp. 1020 (WV. D. N. Y. 1936); Pass Y. Stephens, 22
Ariz. 461, 198 Pac. 712 (1921) ; First Nat. Bank v. Sarvey, 198 Iowa 1067, 193 X. W.
496 (1924) ; Ellwood v. O'Brien, 105 Iox-a 239, 74 N. IV. 740 (1S93) ; Murphy v. Lester,
280 Ky. 51, 132 S. W. (2d) 542 (1939) ; Byrd v. McKoy, 183 Okla. 209, 81 P. (2d)
315 (1938).
178. Green, supra note 56, at 1212 et scq.
179. As examples of this type of statute, see CoLo. STA.T. A.N. (Michie 1935) c. 176,
§ 37; N. Y. DEc.DEiTs EsTATE LAw § 18. Also in point are the community property lavs
found in some of the western states, which provide that one spouse cannot by will deprive
the other spouse of the surviving spouse's share in the community property. See, e.g.,
CAL. PRoB. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 201; WAsH. Ray. STAT. AN.. (Remington, 1932)
§ 1342.
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contract or the will. This is the same technique employed by the psychi-
atrist in diagnosing niental disorder. 80
CONCLUSIONS-THE INARTICULATE STANDARD
Evidentiary facts occur in constellations.' It is their combined effect
which persuades the trier of fact. Hence, it is difficult to single out any
one evidentiary fact and state positively that it has more persuasive po-
tency than the others. Yet certain conclusions can be drawn from judicial
behavior. Evidence of psychopathic behavior is often ignored. Expert as
well as lay opinions of incompetency are frequently brushed aside. And
so we could continue down the list of other evidentiary facts. There
is one evidentiary fact, however, which is seldom ignored, and that is the
abnormality of the transaction. Its probative force may be weakened by
the presence of independent advice or a dearth of evidence of psychopathic
behavior, but it is always an important factor. And herein, if anywhere,
lies the key to an inarticulate standard.
It is submitted that in determining the issue of mental incompetency,
more frequently than otherwise, courts are passing upon the abnormality
of the transaction rather than on the ability of the alleged incompetent
180. LANDIS AND PAGE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8-11. Green, supra note 56, at 1200.
181. There is always present some evidence of psychopathic behavior, and nearly
always both lay and expert opinion of incompetency. In addition to these, the other evi-
dentiary facts occur in constellations of from two to seven. For some of the larger
groupings, see: Cases involving agreements: Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 (1877) (old
age, bodily infirmity, inadequacy of consideration, illiteracy, no independent advice, undue
influence) ; Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42, 188 So. 867 (1939) (age, bodily infirmity, con-
fidential relation, inadequate consideration, undue influence); Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind,
236, 150 N. E. 361 (1926) (age, bodily infirmity, confidential relation, no independent
advice, fraud); Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 284 N. W. 397 (1939) (age, bodily
infirmity, secrecy, no independent advice, confidential relation, undue influence); Met-
tetal v. Hall, 288 Mich. 200, 284 N. W. 698 (1939) (age, bodily infirmity, no independent
advice, inadequacy of consideration, fraud); Stieber v. Vanderlip, 136 Neb. 862, 287
N. W. 773 (1939) (age, confidential relation, bodily infirmity, no independent advice,
fraud) ; Griffin v. Mays, 183 Okla. 350, 82 P. (2d) 836 (1938) (age, bodily infirmity, confi-
dential relation, no independent advice) ; Bliss v. Bahr, 161 Ore. 79, 87 P. (2d) 219 (1939)
(bodily infirmity, age, use of drugs, confidential relation, an abnormal transaction, undue
influence). Will cases: In re Hansen's Estate, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 99, 100 P. (2d) 776
(1940) (fraud, undue influence, age, bodily infirmity, an unnatural will, secrecy) ; In re
Gallo's Estate, 61 Cal. App. 163, 214 Pac. 496 (1923) (undue influence, bodily infirmity,
an unnatural will, secrecy, no independent advice, confidential relation) ; Proffer v. Prof-
fer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938) Xage, bodily infirmity, incapacity to tran-
sact ordinary business, an unnatural will) ; Edge v. Edge, 38 N. J. Eq. 211 (1884) (age,
bodily infirmity, intemperance, an unnatural will); In re Patti's Estate, 133 Pa. Super.
81, 1 A. (2d) 791 (1938) (fraud, undue influence, bodily infirmity, drugs, illiteracy, an
unnatural will, confidential relation) ; Moore v. Horne, 136 S. W. (2d) 638 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940), (undue influence, age, illiteracy, confidential relation, secrecy, an unnatural
will).
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to understand the transaction. To rephrase this thought in terms of legal
doctrine, we might say that since, both in unconscious desire and in articu-
late effort, the court is seeking evidence on whether mental incompetency
has affected the particular transaction, the dominant factor in the evidence
is whether the court sees the particular transaction in its result as that
which a reasonably competent man might have made."
When one states that an articulate standard often is being ignored, and
an inarticulate one followed, the burden of proof rests upon him to prove
'his statement. As in any other situation where one has the burden of
proof, he must bring forth his evidentiary facts in support of his propo-
sition.
The first of such facts is to be found in two rules of law relating
to the operative effect of mental incompetency. According to one line
of authority, mere mental incompetency has no effect upon an inter
vivos transaction unless it is accompanied by other equitable grounds for
relief, such as fraud or gross inadequacy of consideration.lra According
to another line of authority, which has wide support, if wholly or par-
tially executed, a contract may not be rescinded for mental incompetency
unless (a) the other party knew of the mental condition, and (b) the
bargain was an unfair one.18 4 Under either of these rules, it is the ab-
normality of the transaction which is crucial and not the mental condition
of the party.
A second of such facts is to be found in the extremely intimate rela-
tionship between the concepts of fraud, undue influence, and mental
incompetency."'8 They are in a sense complementary and aid each other;
so much so, in fact, that courts frequently engage in the apparently anom-
alous expedient of lumping fractional grounds to spell out a composite
whole. In such a situation it is the abnormality of the transaction which
is the dominant factor. In this connection it should be noted, in passing,
that every evidentiary fact which tends to prove mental incompetency
has been held to be relevant also upon the issues of fraud and undue
influence."' 6
A third such fact is to be found in the practice of allowing the
jury to bring to bear upon.the determination of the issue of mental
182. For this phraseology, the author is indebted to Professor K. N. Llewellyn of Co-
lumbia University.
183. This rule of law is discussed in Green, supra note 78. See Saliba v. James, 143
Fla. 404, 196 So. 832 (1940); Clay v. Clay's Committee, 179 Ky. 494, 200 S. W. 934
(1918).
184. 1 WNitusTo.N, Co~vrRAcrs, 748; Green, supra note 78.
185. See note 141 supra.
186. The logic behind the proposition is this: The core of the concept of fraud is
deception. One who is of weak understanding is more easily deceived. Hence, evidence
tending to prove incapacity for understanding is always admissible on the issue of fraud.
Similarly one of weak understanding, or one suffering from mental disorder which pro-
duces emotional instability is more likely to succumb to the pressure of undue influence.
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incompetency the community mores concerning the normality of the trans-
action in question. In a Massachusetts case, Mr. Justice Holmes said that
incompetency "deals with a question which is mainly one of fact and one
upon which courts have been increasingly unwilling to lay down sweeping
rules. Whether Mrs. Wright was competent to make the assignment was
a question of degree, to be determined by the jury on all the facts and
circumstances of the case." 187 The scope of the evidence on the issue of
mental incompetency is wide; and among other things, both in contract
cases and will cases, the jury is permitted to take into consideration the
normality or abnormality of the transaction as evidence. The rule of law
which they are given to guide them is a vague one, capacity to understand.
Fact-pressures 18 are apt to be more telling with a jury- than vague rules
of law, and it is to be expected that a jury will apply the community stand-
ard of fairness in passing on the validity of the transaction.18 9 Upon
review the appellate court is apt to do likewise. Thus, while lip service
is paid to the articulate standard, the real decision springs from the com-
munity mores concerning the abnormality of the transaction. Much the
same process is seen in other areas of the law. 00 In a personal injury suit
the jury is given as its norms for decision abstract definitions of negli-
gence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause; under cover of these,
and usually without much likelihood of reversal, it can apply its own ideas
of the social function of automobile liability insurance. Likewise, in cer-
tain types of murder cases, the court may define the crime of murder for
the jury, but the jury draws upon the mores of the community and applies
the "unwritten law" as the real norm for the decision.
The last evidentiary fact in support of the thesis is the degree of
reliance which courts place upon the abnormality of the transaction in
sustaining a finding of mental incompetency, or, conversely, the degree
of reliance they place upon the normality of the transaction in reversing
a finding of mental incompetency.
It may be argued that such an inarticulate standard is too indefinite to
be serviceable, that there is no point in substituting for one vague standard
another equally vague, that it runs counter to the idea of freedom of con-
tract and the idea of testatorial absolutism. Let us examine these criti-
cisms.
187. Wright v. Wright, 139 Mass. 177, 182, 29 N. E. 380, 382 (1885).
188. For exposition of the theory that fact-pressures will produce a fair quantum
of wise case-results despite poor doctrine, see Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse
Sales (1939) 52 HARv. L. RFv. 873, 876.
189. Professor Powell, of Columbia University, has suggested that this process repre-
sents, in a limited degree, a return to the original function of the jury. Originally the
jury was a body of witnesses, and it only gradually developed into a body of triers. 1
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922) 317-19.
190. See HoLuEs, COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 181, 184, 237.
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Even if the inarticulate standard is just as vague as the articulate one,
that is no reason for denying its existence if its presence can be proved.
If it really exists, no matter what its merits or demerits, a service is done
for legal science if it is recognized. The province of a science is to dis-
cover and acknowledge facts, not to cover them up. If they turn out to
be unpleasant facts, or socially deleterious ones, their discovery is the first
step in the corrective process.
The author does not concede, however, that the inarticulate standard
is equally as vague as the articulate one. Its frank recognition might well
result in greater certainty and predictability in this beclouded area of the
law. An abnormal transaction is an unfair transaction. Whether or not
a transaction is unfair depends upon the type of transaction and
the circumstances. A gift is unfair to the donor if it strips him of
all of his property and leaves him and his family at the mercy of charity,
public or private. A gift is an unfair one to the other "natural objects of
the donor's bounty" if, without reason, it excludes them from the gift.
This is especially true when testamentary dispositions are involved. A
bargain is an unfair one to the alleged incompetent or his dependents, if
the consideration he received is grossly inadequate. The standards of un-
fairness, in each instance, will be furnished by the mores of the commu-
nity. To be actionable the unfairness must manifest itself in a transaction
which is obviously out of line with the institutional pattern of similar
transactions. To make such a determination all of the circumstanc-
es must be taken into account. The dominant factor in the evidence
is whether the court sees the particular transaction in its result as
that which a reasonably competent man might have made. This is both
rational and reasonable and true to the essence of a case-law system.
Such an inarticulate standard does run counter to the ideas of freedom of
contract and testatorial absolutism, but the net effect of applying such a
standard would result in no greater curtailment of these two freedoms
than the application of the orthodox rule-perhaps not as great.
If the existence of this inarticulate standard is recognized, it will
help to explain the close relationship between fraud, undue influence, and
mental incompetency as invalidating agencies; to explain that the same
set of facts may make out a case of fraud or undue influence or mental
incompetency; to explain the judicial amalganmation of fractions of these
grounds." 1 The abnormality of the transaction is the dominant factor
in each.
It is not suggested that courts always disregard the articulate standard
of mental incompetency which they have formulated and deliberately em-
ploy an inarticulate one. Perhaps, in a large percentage of the cases, the
courts are trying earnestly to apply the rule or doctrine of the "under-
191. See note 141 supra.
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standing" test, and in the obvious cases this is not too difficult. If the
evidence of mental incompetency is very weak, and if there are no circum-
stances indicating the presence of fraud or undue influence, the orthodox
test will serve to uphold the transaction. Likewise, if the evidence of
mental incompetency is overwhelming, the orthodox test will serve to in-
validate the transaction. But most cases are not obvious. Most cases
dealing with mental incompetency are debatable cases, where there is evi-
dence pro and con. It is here that the orthodox "understanding" tests
fail. How can a court or jury tell whether or not a deceased grantor or
a testator was capable of understanding the transaction? Obviously it
can not. There are no guide posts marking the boundaries of "under-
standing," no outside limits. It is in this situation that courts fall back
upon the inarticulate standard. No doubt many courts still feel that they
are trying to apply doctrine and are unaware that they are reaching else-
where to find strength. The process is instinctive. But not a few courts
have intimated in their opinions that they were aware of the broader
ground upon which they were resting their decisions. A few cases hint
at it; some almost give it verbal formulation. In a late Alabama case I"
the court cancelled a deed, relying upon age, bodily infirmity, impaired
mental condition, a confidential relation, undue influence, and inadequate
consideration. The court was "impressed that the transaction was unjust
and should not be supported." ' An Arizona case 194 also seems to lean
heavily upon the element of "unfairness." And in a California case, 105
the court, affirming a judgment setting aside the deed of a mental incom-
petent, stated:
"It seems that the current of authority, English and American,
is unvarying in its adherence to the same beneficent remedies in
favor of the weak and ignorant, as against the wiles of the crafty
and the greed of the avaricious, and although judges have differed
in reasons given for the application of the rule, and the phases under
which it has been applied are numerous and diverse, yet the con-
clusion reached is quite uniformly the same, whether the donee act
in good or bad faith." 101
192. Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42, 188 So. 867 (1939).
193. Id. at 49, 188 So. at 872.
194. Smith v. Mosbarger, 18 Ariz. 19, 156 Pac. 79 (1916).
195. Richards v. Donner, 72 Cal. 207, 13 Pac. 584 (1887).
196. Richards v. Donner, 72 Cal. 207, 211, 13 Pac. 584, 586 (1887). See also Mettetal
v. Hall, 288 Mich. 200, 216, 284 N. W. 698, 704 (1939), in which the court affirming the
action of the trial court in setting aside a transaction on the grounds of mental incompet-
ency and fraud, stated: "'the equitable rule is of universal application, that where a person
is not equal to protecting himself in the particular case, the court will protect him' "; In
re Patti's Estate, 133 Pa. Super. 81, 95, 1 A. (2d) 791, 798 (1938), in which the court said:
".. . the law is rigid in insisting that one of weak mind, whether from inherent causes
or by reason of illness, shall not be imposed upon by the art and craft of designing per-
sons."
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Law has been described as nothing more pretentious than a prophecy
of what the courts will do in fact.1 7 If this definition is accepted, the
real standard of nkental incompetence will not be found in the judicial
tests announced by the courts. Another standard, although for the most
part inarticulate, is the standard of the fairness or the unfairness of the
transaction. It is a standard which is calibrated to measure not only men-
tal incompetency but also fraud and undue influence. It is implemented
to measure and synthesize fractions of these grounds. In order to predict
the outcome of any future case, one needs to know the inarticulate stan-
dard by which the case may be judged.
197. Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARv. L RE%. 457, 460.
